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HEALTH PRIVACY AND (LACK OF) LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN A 
TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN ECONOMY 
Mystica M. Alexander, Cheryl Kirschner, Patrick A. Scholten, 
David J. Yates* 
Applying the perspectives of law, technology, and economics, 
this article explores the privacy concerns arising from the ability 
of search engines and web domain owners to indiscriminately 
track an individual’s health-related internet searches. Using the 
hypothetical example of a forty-year-old woman diagnosed with 
high cholesterol who turns to Google to begin gathering data 
about her condition and her treatment options, this article 
discusses the many ways in which technology can be used to 
gather, store, aggregate, and track an unsuspecting user’s health-
related searches as she surfs the web for information. From an 
economic perspective, financial incentives abound for those who 
conduct business by compiling these various bits of information on 
consumers through their internet activities. Having laid this 
foundation, this article then explores what legal protections exist 
under current privacy law to protect computer users from such 
intrusions. Finding a distinct lack of protection in the law, this 
article concludes with a recommendation that Congress take 






                                                
* Mystica Alexander is an Associate Professor of Law and Taxation at Bentley 
University. Cheryl Kirschner is a Senior Lecturer of Law at Babson College. 
Patrick Scholten is an Associate Professor of Economics at Bentley University. 
David Yates is an Associate Professor of Computer Information Systems at 
Bentley University. The authors thank Christina Zandri and William Wiggins 
for their assistance with this project. 
2 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 19: 1 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................2	
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ONLINE TRACKING TECHNOLOGY AND ITS 
INCREASING IMPOSITION ON PRIVACY ..................................7	
A. First-Party Tracking and Consumer Privacy .....................7	
B. Third-Party Tracking .......................................................13	
II. THE ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS OF UNINHIBITED TRACKING 
AND DATA COLLECTION ......................................................16	
A. An Introduction to Online Tracking Technologies and 
Advertising: How Personal and Non-Personal 
Information Is Exchanged for “Free” Health-Related 
Internet Content ..............................................................20	
B. Internet Technology and Economic Incentives: Price 
Discrimination ................................................................26	
III. LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY ...................33	
A. The Historical Roots of Privacy Protection .....................34	
B. Federal Standards ............................................................37	
1.	 Federal Statutes ........................................................38	
2.	 Regulatory Efforts .....................................................39	
C. State Efforts ......................................................................44	
1.	 State Constitutions ....................................................45	
2.	 State Common Law ...................................................49	
3.	 State Data Privacy Statutes ......................................53	
IV. THE TRACKING OF HEALTH-RELATED SEARCHES IS NOT 
WITHIN THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED BY HIPAA ............57	
A. The Origins of HIPAA Highlight the Importance of Health 
Information Privacy ........................................................57	
B. The Privacy Rule of HIPAA ..............................................60	
C. Health-Related Searches as PHI? ....................................63	
V. LEGISLATION LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THIRD-PARTY 




Consider this scenario: Pamela, a forty-year-old female, is 
informed by her doctor that she has high cholesterol and is at high 
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risk for coronary artery disease. If she is like many other 
individuals in today’s world, she will soon log on to her computer 
to conduct Google or other internet searches1 using terms such as 
“women and high cholesterol,” “cholesterol-lowering drugs,” and 
“coronary artery disease” to learn more about her new health 
concern. As she searches, there is a high likelihood that her queries 
are being tracked.2 Due to advances in tracking technologies and 
data mining capabilities, simply conducting searches increases the 
probability that these searches can be traced back specifically to 
her.3 Early tracking capabilities, such as cookies, were used as 
benign text files placed on users’ computers to facilitate 
information transfers, such as keeping track of items in an online 
shopping cart.4 Newer, more intrusive, third-party tracking 
technologies place files on or send a script to users’ computers.5 
These trackers are designed to gather information on website 
users’ behaviors across internet domains.6 And although third-party 
tracking is often fragmented and messy, data mining and data 
warehousing can improve the quality of this tracking data by 
connecting it to additional information gathered, such as a user’s 
IP address, location, name, or associations in their social 
                                                
 1 See Ryan W. White & Eric Horvitz, Experiences with Web Search on 
Medical Concerns and Self Diagnosis, AMIA ANN. SYMP. PROC. 696 (finding 
that “wealth of medical information on the Web makes it convenient for non-
experts to conduct their own diagnosis and healthcare assessment based on 
limited knowledge of signs, symptoms, and disorders.”). 
 2 See Greg R. Notess, Tracking Your Search History, ONLINE (Mar./Apr. 
2006), http://www.infotoday.com/online/mar06/OnTheNet.shtml (explaining 
that the personalization enabled by consumer tracking in search engines “offers 
the opportunity to build user loyalty by more effectively targeting advertising 
and search results. The personalization features include such options as saving 
URLs, archiving pages, organizing saved results into folders, blocking specific 
sites, and recording a search history.”). 
 3 See Jonathan R. Mayer & John C. Mitchell, Third-Party Web Tracking: Policy 
and Technology, PROC. 2012 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 413, 415 
(2012), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/trackingsurvey12.pdf. 
 4 See David M. Kristol, HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics, 1 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 151, 152–54 (2001). 
 5 See Mayer & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 421. 
 6 See id. at 415. 
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networks.7 This aggregated information is then purchased by 
companies that use the information gleaned from online activity to 
effectively sort individuals by certain characteristics, customize 
goods and services, and even engage in price discrimination.8 
Given today’s technology, such a consequence is more than 
just a mere possibility. Consider, for example, a change Google 
made to its privacy policy in June of 2016. As part of the 
company’s plan to create more robust consumer profiles, Google 
“asked users to accept a new policy that would allow them to more 
easily see—and delete—the information Google holds about 
them.”9 This included giving Google permission to combine 
information on the individual’s Google searches and email with 
information on the individual’s browsing history.10 This new policy 
marked a drastic departure from Google’s nearly ten-year-old 
policy of separating data from search, email, and its DoubleClick 
business (DoubleClick is a subsidiary of Google that develops and 
provides Internet advertising delivery services).11 In December of 
2016, two U.S. privacy advocacy groups filed a complaint against 
Google with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in response 
to this policy change.12 In their complaint, the privacy advocates 
alleged that 
Google took affirmative steps to conceal and downplay the significance 
of this transformational change that eliminated the barrier between the 
data that Google gathers from cookies that track users’ behavior and the 
personal information that Google holds from its users’ accounts. 
Google induced users to accept the change to its privacy policy by 
cloaking it in an offer to enable ‘new features’ that purport to provide 
                                                
 7 See id. 
 8 See Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman & Kimberly Meltzer, Open to 
Exploitation: America’s Shoppers Online and Offline, A Report from the 
Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania (2005) 
(suggesting that it is “a complex mix of ignorance and knowledge, fear and 
bravado, realism and idealism that leaves most internet-using adult American 
shoppers open to financial exploitation by retailers.”). 
 9  Natalia Drozdiak & Jack Nicas, Google Privacy-Policy Change Faces New 
Scrutiny in EU, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/oracle-
expresses-concern-to-eu-over-google-privacy-policy-1485263548. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See id. 
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‘more control’ over users’ personal information. Unsuspecting users 
accepted Google’s offer in droves.13 
Such actions beg the question of whether a normal citizen like 
Pamela should have a reasonable expectation of privacy as she 
surfs the web to gather information about high cholesterol. If so, 
what is the extent of reasonable privacy protection? 
To begin, many scholars have noted the difficulty in defining 
“privacy.”14 Fundamentally, “the desire for privacy is an innate 
aspect of human nature. For that reason, many have found that the 
most productive and credible way of justifying privacy is as a 
natural right aspect of human dignity.”15 Some philosophy scholars 
have argued that “there is no overarching concept of privacy but 
rather several distinct core notions that have been lumped 
together.”16 Some have defined privacy in freedom-based terms: 
[t]he right to privacy is an integral part of our humanity; one has a 
public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded and 
preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives 
shall become public and which parts we shall hold close.17 
Others have attempted to clarify this murky area by defining 
three categories or “clusters” of privacy: spatial privacy (involving 
a person’s solitude and freedom from physical invasion), 
decisional privacy (involving the freedom to make certain 
decisions without interference), and informational privacy 
(involving the ability to determine the conditions under which 
others receive information about oneself).18 While these spheres 
are not “sharply separate,” they are helpful distinctions for 
                                                
 13 Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief at 2 (Dec. 
16, 2016), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/ftc_google_complaint_12-
5-2016docx.pdf. 
 14 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088 
(2002). 
 15 Samuel P. Winch, Moral Justifications for Privacy and Intimacy, 11 J. 
MASS MEDIA ETHICS 197, 198 (1996). 
 16 Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215 
(2003). 
 17 Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). 
 18 Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 845 (2002). 
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discussing possible privacy protection schemes.19 Our analysis is 
limited to informational privacy. 
In light of the increasing potential of technology to infringe 
upon an individual’s informational privacy, especially with regard 
to health-related information, and the potential economic 
implications of such infringement, this paper explores the legal 
protections of an individual’s right to privacy and proposes 
legislative action to limit industries’ abilities to continue 
indiscriminate tracking and aggregation of individual health-
related information. Part I of this Article provides a discussion of 
the technological possibilities and realities of the 21st century, and 
how technologies are used to gather, sort, aggregate, and store user 
information. Part II offers a description of the economic 
motivations behind the tracking and collection of user data. 
Advances in technology have given rise to new online 
intermediaries, such as online advertisers and price aggregating 
and comparison sites, that create and use platforms to add user 
value and create exploitative profit opportunities. However, these 
activities have significant implications for consumer privacy. Part 
III traces the legal history of user data protection and examines the 
current state of protection at both the federal and state levels. Part 
IV considers whether the tracking and aggregation of user 
information in the context of health-related issues should be 
subject to special scrutiny. Moreover, the section asks whether the 
current methods for tracking, collecting, and storing health-related 
user search inquiries violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
privacy protections provided by the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Part V concludes that industry 
self-regulation alone is not adequate to protect against abuses of 
user informational privacy and proposes federal legislation limiting 
the ability of third-party trackers to gather and aggregate health-
related data. 
                                                
 19 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1193, 1203 (1998). 
OCT. 2017] Health Privacy 7 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ONLINE TRACKING TECHNOLOGY AND ITS 
INCREASING IMPOSITION ON PRIVACY 
How a business initially obtains a user’s information should be 
a key factor when considering the potential privacy harms of 
commercial data aggregation and analysis.20 Arguably, there is a 
distinction among a user’s privacy expectation in information 
voluntarily given, such as on a survey, transactional information a 
company gleaned from an online purchase, and data collected 
about a user’s online searches, such as in the opening scenario. 
A. First-Party Tracking and Consumer Privacy 
Most website owners directly collect, track users’ behaviors, 
and store personal identifiable information (“PII”) and non-
personal identifiable information (“Non-PII”) on visitors using 
different mechanisms. According to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, [P]II is: 
any information about an individual maintained by an agency, 
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date and 
place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any 
other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as 
medical, educational, financial, and employment information.21 
                                                
 20 A fascinating point of law tangentially related to the topic of this article is 
whether and to what extent the government is permitted to access and use 
information voluntarily transmitted by a business about a citizen. In United 
States v. Miller, Justice Powell wrote for the majority:  
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed. 
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1978). 
 21 Erika McCallister et al., Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality to 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS 
AND TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 2010), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/ 
nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf. 
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In contrast, non-PII is data that cannot be solely utilized to 
identify or trace a person.22 Traditionally, examples include device 
IDs, IP addresses, and cookies; however, the distinction between 
PII and non-PII has become increasingly blurred.23 This is the 
essence of first-party tracking: a website (Internet domain) owner 
directly collects information on everyone visiting their website. In 
this context, “first-party” refers to which organization or website is 
doing the tracking and “tracking” refers to the mechanism used to 
collect the user information. In the context of Pamela, the forty-
year-old woman diagnosed with high cholesterol, her internet 
search would result in Google storing a small text file, called a 
“first-party cookie,” on her computer that uniquely identifies her 
browser or her device, distinguishes it from other users, and 
identifies how she interacted with the Google search engine.24 
Here, Google is the first party, and its tracking mechanism is the 
cookie it places on Pamela’s computer. By tracking and identifying 
users, website owners create and update user profiles. 
The most elementary form of first-party tracking occurs when a 
user creates a profile through a user account with a website owner 
                                                
 22 See Mark H. Rosenbaum, Identifying Unethical Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) Privacy Violations Committed by IS/IT Practitioners: A 
Comparison to Computing Moral Exemplars (Feb. 2015) (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Nova Southeastern University), http://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd/29. 
 23 See Massimiliano Pappalardo, Personal Data or Non-Personal Data That Is 
the Question! The Different Interpretations of ECJ and Italian Supreme Court, 
(Oct. 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=804ce9b8-dfa5-
4c67-bbf7-4cc3e087c2f8. Note, PII is a term used primarily within the United 
States, whereas the term personal data is the European equivalent to PII, with 
some caveats. The EU directive 95/46/EC defines personal data as: 
Article 2(a): ‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable 
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular, 
by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or 
social identity. 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 2(a). 
 24 Google Analytics, Google Analytics Cookie Usage on Websites, 
https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/cookie-
usage (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
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and logs into their account to access that website. As part of the 
account set-up process the website owner may ask for various 
pieces of information, such as name and contact information, and 
when users voluntarily reveal this identifying information, tracking 
related to such disclosures is explicit. For example, our forty-year-
old woman may have voluntarily created a Google account and 
may have been signed into it when she conducted an internet 
search for “women with high cholesterol.” By providing her name, 
date of birth, gender, mobile phone number, email address and 
location, Google will give her access to other services it offers and 
will provide a secure, more personalized experience. Information 
disclosures such as these permit users to gain access to additional 
content or website features in exchange for personal (or 
clickstream) information that website owners can use.25 
While personal online profile accounts or profiles permit 
explicit first-party tracking, there are many examples of website 
owners that use implicit first-party tracking mechanisms. These 
commonly-used computer browser-based tracking mechanisms 
include: 1) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”) cookies,26 2) 
Internet Protocol (“IP”) address identification,27 and 3) browser 
fingerprinting.28 
While the Internet is a networking infrastructure consisting of 
networks of networks, the Web—or World Wide Web—is the 
                                                
 25 Clickstream information is a series of mouse clicks made while accessing 
one or more websites. See Randolph E. Bucklin & Catarina Sismeiro, Click 
Here for Internet Insight: Advances in Clickstream Data Analysis in Marketing, 
23 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 35, 35–37 (2009). 
 26 David Kristol & Lou Montulli, HTTP State Management, Request for 
Comments (Oct. 2000), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2965.txt. 
 27 Client IP addresses are logged as part of standard practice by web servers so 
that Internet domain owners know basic information about clients who have 
accessed content hosted on their servers. When combined with other information 
in a standard log entry, e.g. a timestamp, a reverse DNS lookup of the IP 
address, the client TCP port number, the identity of the client device can be 
determined. For a description of a standard log entry, see the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) Extended Log File Format, https://www.w3.org/TR/WD-
logfile.html. 
 28 Peter Eckersley, How Unique Is Your Web Browser?, INTERNATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES SYMPOSIUM 1, 1–18 (Jul. 
2010). 
10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 19: 1 
protocol for accessing information (websites) over the Internet. 
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the dominant 
application layer protocol for data communication over the Web. 
Originally, HTTP was designed as a stateless protocol; meaning 
that each user’s request to a website is treated independently of 
previous requests from the same user.29 The implication is that 
websites and their applications cannot track user configuration 
settings or retain transaction information between sessions or web 
pages. This feature of the HTTP protocol severely limits the 
potential usefulness of the World Wide Web and the Internet. For 
example, a stateless protocol would preclude a website from 
remembering what an online shopper had added to their shopping 
cart. 
To overcome the stateless feature of HTTP, websites send and 
store small text data files, called HTTP cookies, on a user’s 
computer via the internet browser while a user is browsing.30 
HTTP cookies were designed to maintain state information 
between a user and websites she has visited, such as remembering 
items added to a shopping cart in an online store and browsing 
activities across pages maintained by a website owner. In addition 
to maintaining state information, HTTP cookies remember other 
pieces of information that a user may have entered on a website 
owner’s pages like passwords and credit card numbers.31 Cookies 
play an important role in how modern websites work. Their 
management of state by the web browser and web server provides 
a convenient and reliable way of remembering things such as 
where a user left off the last time she visited a site and any user 
preferences.32 To maintain state information, a website “sets” a 
cookie in a user’s browser. The information encoded in the cookie, 
the use of the cookie by the website owner, and the ability to link 
the cookie with other information all generate privacy concerns.33 
                                                
 29 See Ray Fielding, Jim Gettys, Jeff Mogul, Henrik Frystyk, Larry Masinter, 
Paul Leach & Tim Berners-Lee, Hypertext Transfer Protocol—HTTP/1.1, 
Request for Comments (Jun. 1999), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt. 
 30 See Kristol, supra note 4, at 153. 
 31 Id. at 155. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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Two common types of first-party HTTP cookies are session 
cookies and persistent cookies.34 A session cookie is a temporary 
text file that is removed from the computer user’s cache memory 
when the web browser closes. The purpose of a session cookie is to 
store state information only while a user visits a website. In regards 
to consumer privacy concerns, session cookies are the most benign 
first-party tracking technology since they are deleted once the 
browser session is terminated and are not used for tracking over 
time or across websites. In contrast, a persistent cookie is a small 
text file placed on a computer that remains in a browser’s data 
storage so that the cookie communicates its information to the 
website upon every visit. Persistent cookies expire either on a 
specific date or after a specific length of time.35 The enduring 
nature of persistent cookies enables users to remain logged into a 
website for a period of time and store information on behalf of the 
website owner. It also permits a website to track a user’s behavior 
while visiting the pages on its website. Despite the upside of 
facilitating interactions and improving users’ experiences, 
persistent cookies are more invasive in terms of privacy since 
websites can learn about users’ behavior and potentially use that 
information in ways that could be harmful to the consumer.36 
While users can set browser settings to disable cookies or easily 
remove them from their computers, a new class of cookies has 
been developed that cannot easily be deleted.37 
                                                
 34 See Nicholas C. Zakas, HTTP Cookies Explained, NCZONLINE (May 5, 
2009), https://www.nczonline.net/blog/2009/05/05/http-cookies-explained/ (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2017). By default, “a cookie has a lifespan of a single session. 
A session is defined as finished when the browser is shut down, so session 
cookies exist only while the browser remains open.” Id. For a cookie to persist 
on a client device after a browser is shut down, the default behavior can be 
modified by setting an expiration date and time for a cookie, which specifies 
when the cookie “may be deleted by the browser.” Id. Therefore, a persistent 
cookie is stored on the client device until it expires. 
 35 MDN TECHNOLOGIES, HTTP Cookies, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
 36 See infra Part II. 
 37 This new class of cookies is called evercookies or zombie cookies that are 
persistent and cannot be (easily) deleted. See Jacqui Cheung, Zombie Cookie 
Wars: Evil Tracking API Meant to Raise Awareness, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 22, 
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Browser fingerprinting and Internet Protocol (“IP”) address 
tracking are two other commonly used implicit, first-party tracking 
mechanisms, which differ from HTTP cookies in that they are 
stateless.38 Unlike persistent cookie technology that can be used to 
identify and track users’ online behavior over time on a particular 
website, browser fingerprinting relies on a combination of user’s 
browser and computer configuration that the website can retrieve 
with each visit.39 Individually, the identifiers within a “fingerprint” 
are incapable of identifying a specific individual. However, the 
personal-identification power is derived from examining these 
identifiers collectively. The chance that two individuals have the 
exact same settings and specifications is only one in several 
million individuals.40 Browser fingerprinting is viewed as the most 
invasive violation of consumer privacy because: 1) it is virtually 
impossible for users to detect; 2) it is difficult to prevent; and 3) it 
is semi-permanent.41 Although not as invasive as browser 
fingerprinting, IP address tracking is another first-party tracking 
mechanism that facilitates individual- or household-level 
identification and tracking, and it can be technically difficult for 
lay users to prevent. Each computer or router connects to the 
Internet using an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), who assigns 
                                                                                                         
2010), https://arstechnica.com/business/2010/09/evercookie-escalates-the-zombie-
cookie-war-by-raising-awareness/. 
 38 Browser fingerprinting and IP address tracking can also be used as third-party 
tracking technologies. See NPR Staff, Online Trackers Follow Our Digital 
Shadow by “Fingerprinting” Browsers, Devices, NPR (Sept. 16, 2016, 5:58 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/09/26/495502526/online-
trackers-follow-our-digital-shadow-by-fingerprinting-browsers-devices. 
 39 The collected information is extensive and typically includes: browser type 
and version, the computer operating system and version, screen resolution, 
supported fonts, plugins, time zone, language, font preferences, and sometimes 
other hardware configurations. See Lance Cottrell, Browser Fingerprints, and 
Why They Are So Hard to Erase, NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 17, 2015, 6:22 AM), 
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2884026/security0/browser-fingerprints-
and-why-they-are-so-hard-to-erase.html. 
 40 This statistic suggests that browser fingerprinting is a highly successful 
individual-identifying mechanism. Id. 
 41 Id. 
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each computer or router a unique IP address.42 By itself, an IP 
address does not contain any personally identifiable information; 
however, a website can identify a user’s IP address, which can 
reveal the user’s geographical region.43 The implication is that a 
website can, with some degree of accuracy, link an IP address to an 
individual user.44 
B. Third-Party Tracking 
In contrast to first-party tracking technologies, the common 
elements of third-party tracking technologies are twofold: 1) the 
mechanism is initiated by a party other than the website owner and 
2) the technologies can identify, collect, store, and aggregate 
personal and non-personal information about a user over time and 
across websites. Third-party tracking technologies can be used 
when a website partners with an advertising network to populate 
blank ad-space or partners with an analytics company to better 
understand users’ behaviors. Pamela may visit a website to 
research the health implications of her high cholesterol and 
encounter an advertisement that relies on third-party tracking 
technology to deliver the advertisement based on certain personally 
identifiable and non-personally identifiable user information, for 
example, her age, gender, browsing history, or search history. 
There are many different third-party tracking technologies. 
Broadly, these are categorized as “stateful” and “stateless” 
technologies. Stateful third-party tracking technologies, such as 
                                                
 42 PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, Online Privacy: Using the Internet 
Safely, PRC, https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/online-privacy-
using-internet-safely (last visited Sept. 6, 2017). 
 43 There are two possible weaknesses in an ISP assignment of IP addresses: 1) 
ISPs’ privacy policies vary considerably and may disclose an individual’s or a 
household’s IP address and 2) ISPs assign IP addresses based on geographical 
location and the specificity of that assignment varies with ISP. Id. 
 44 Why IP Tracking Is a Bad Idea, AD EXCHANGER (Jul. 30, 2010, 12:09 AM), 
https://adexchanger.com/the-debate/why-ip-tracking-is-a-bad-idea/ (discussing a 
2010 test that revealed the ability of IP addresses to accurately identify about 
thirty percent of U.S. households). 
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third-party cookies, use a variety of technologies, including many 
of which fall under the umbrella term of supercookies.45 
Like a first-party cookie, a third-party cookie is a small file 
residing on a website user’s computer that identifies personal and 
non-personal information. However, unlike a first-party cookie, the 
origin of the third-party cookie is a website other than where a user 
is currently visiting. For example, if Pamela visits an information 
content provider’s website, like WebMD.com, and encounters an 
advertisement for a cholesterol-lowering drug, like Repatha, and 
she clicks on the advertisement and is redirected to a non-
WebMD.com website, then a third-party cookie may have been 
used in the redirection process. A third-party cookie was likely 
used to help identify (based on her personally identifiable and non-
personally identifiable information) with what advertisement to 
populate the ad space on WebMD.com, and where to redirect the 
user as she clicked on the ad. Third-party cookies have the benefit 
of maintaining a stateful relationship with the user and the first 
party, thereby permitting third parties to identify, collect, store, and 
aggregate information about specific users over time and across 
different websites.46 
Some types of supercookies place small files on a user’s 
computer to facilitate communication with websites using Adobe 
Flash or HTML5 local storage.47 These cookies can store a user’s 
preference information, retrieve saved data from a supercookie-
enabled application, or track users’ behavior across time and 
websites.48 Supercookies can be automatically recreated after a 
user deletes them by storing the information in multiple locations 
                                                
 45 Jose Pagliery, “Super cookies” Track You, Even in Privacy Mode, CNN 
TECH (Jan. 9, 2015, 10:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/09/ 
technology/security/super-cookies/. 
 46 Mayer & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 415. 
 47 Flash cookies also are called local shared objects (LSOs). Id. at 421. 
 48 John Naughton, When the Cookies Crumbled, So Did Your Web Anonymity, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2014, 7:05 PM). https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2014/oct/05/cookies-crumbled-internet-anonymity. 
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on the user’s computer, which is more invasive than other standard 
HTTP cookie technologies.49 
Clearly, “an abundance of data, inexpensive processing power, 
and increasingly sophisticated analytical techniques drive 
innovation in our increasingly networked society.”50 Indiscriminate 
data collection from online user behavior can be collected and used 
in many ways. As discussed in this section, types of data collection 
fall into two categories, first-party tracking and third-party 
tracking, with some overlap between the two distinctions. Many 
different tracking mechanisms, however, are used by both types of 
tracking. Although the use of data collected via tracking is often 
aligned with users’ interests, data gathered during online activity 
are also used to target sponsored content like online advertisements 
as well as unsponsored content like related web pages. 
Independent of the type of tracking technology used is a 
general lack of transparency and understanding between websites 
and users. A Pew Research survey in 2013 asked Americans to 
respond “true” or “false” to the following question: “When a 
company posts a privacy policy, it ensures that the company keeps 
confidential all the information it collects on users.” About 50 
percent of survey respondents incorrectly answered, believing the 
statement was “true.”51 Beyond the lack of user understanding of 
websites’ privacy policies, there is also an increasing lack of 
transparency between what users are giving up in exchange for 
accessing the information or services hosted by a website, 
especially in the realm of consumer privacy regarding health 
information. To access information or services for “free,” users 
unknowingly give up personal and non-personal information, 
which can lead to the creation of detailed user profiles over time. 
                                                
 49 Understanding Other Online Tracking, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER 
INFO. (June 2016), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0042-online-
tracking#Understanding_Other_Online_Tracking. 
 50 THE WHITE HOUSE, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A 
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global 
Digital Economy, 4 J. PRIVACY CONFIDENTIALITY 95, 99 (2012). 
 51 Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy 
Is, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/. 
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Beyond user identification, it is also important to understand how 
websites owners use personal and non-personal information to 
further their economic objectives. 
II. THE ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS OF UNINHIBITED TRACKING 
AND DATA COLLECTION 
In 1961, Nobel Laureate George Stigler wrote “[o]ne should 
hardly have to tell academicians that information is a valuable 
resource: knowledge is power. Any yet it occupies a slum dwelling 
in the town of economics. Mostly it is ignored . . . .”52 In the half-
century since, a burgeoning literature has led to significant 
developments in the field of information economics.53 There are 
many legitimate reasons for web property owners to gather, 
aggregate, and use personally identifiable and non-personally 
identifiable information about a site visitor, and the law is well-
settled that such information can be valuable, confidential 
information protected by trade secret law.54 Businesses may want 
to identify and refine target markets; learn about and predict future 
spending and inventory needs; improve and track advertising 
effectiveness; offer complimentary discounts personalized to a 
consumer;55 offer coupons designed to encouraged consumers to 
switch to a competing brand; increase volume of consumers 
buying store brands or higher-profit-margin items; track timing of 
purchases to assess staffing needs; develop individualized profiles 
for more effective introduction of new or complementary products; 
design products more likely to be successful; and/or engage in a 
host of other business strategies and decisions.56 While many 
consumers might not object to their personal and non-personal 
information being collected to further business interests or to 
enhance their shopping experiences, many consumers would likely 
                                                
 52 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 
213 (1961). 
 53 Joseph Stiglitz, Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective, 95 
ECON. J. 21, 23–24 (1985). 
 54 Brian Yeh, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE 
SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 2 (2016). 
 55 In this section, we interchangeably use the terms “consumers” and “users.” 
 56 Yeh, supra note 54. 
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feel differently if data collection and use had a negative impact on 
them economically. Does or should a consumer’s right to 
informational privacy vary according to how the data about her is 
being used or to the nature of the interaction between all 
individuals involved in an interaction? What are the economic 
implications of consumer online data gathering for both businesses 
and consumers? 
Our understanding of how information impacts economic 
agents’ behavior and market outcomes is significantly richer today 
than forty years ago. We have a better understanding of how 1) 
economic agents transmit and receive private information to 
mitigate market and non-market uncertainty and 2) asymmetrically 
informed economic agents impact market efficiency and 
outcomes.57 Information can serve as an efficient coordination 
mechanism to match economic agents on two sides of an 
exchange, improve market efficiency and reduce transaction 
costs.58 The impact of asymmetrically informed economic agents 
on market and non-market environments also has been widely 
studied.59 Recent technological innovations have given economic 
agents on all sides of market interactions greater opportunities to 
collect, store, and transmit information and have led to more 
indiscriminate data collection.60 This market activity, combined 
with health care legislation in the United States, provides an 
opportunity to explore the economic value of health information.61 
                                                
 57 Stiglitz, supra note 53, at 29–30. 
 58 Muriel Niederle, Alvin Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, Matchingversi 
(Forthcoming in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 11). 
 59 Stiglitz, supra note 53; Antonio Cordella, Transaction Costs and 
Information Systems: Does IT Add Up?, 21 J. INF. TECH. 195 (2006). 
 60 Ben Rosen, EU Court Slams Indiscriminate Data Collection, Opening 
Challenge to British Cyber Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 21, 2016), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/1221/EU-court-slams-
indiscriminate-data-collection-opening-challenge-to-British-cyber-law. 
 61 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 
Fed. Reg. 53,181, 53,254 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 160 
and 164); see also Technical Corrections to the Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,944 (Dec. 29, 
2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164). 
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Rapid innovation in internet technology has created a vast 
global network of voluntarily interconnected autonomous 
computer networks built on the Internet Protocol suite: 
Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (“TCP/IP”).62 
The Internet continues to fundamentally change the ways that 
individuals acquire and transmit information, connect socially and 
at work, shop for goods and services, and consume entertainment.63 
Our interconnected world has created significant economic 
opportunities for information content providers and other 
intermediaries that create platforms to connect individuals and 
organizations on both sides of market and non-market 
interactions.64 An implication of the autonomous characteristics of 
the Internet is that it operates without a central governing body.65 
Each constituent network, web property owner, and intermediary 
platform operator sets its own privacy policies.66 The pace of 
advances in internet technology, especially in the area of tracking 
technologies like those described in sections I.A and I.B, have 
                                                
     62 The TCP/IP protocol is the standard set of communications protocols that 
permit users on different computer networks to transmit and receive 
information. The suite specifies how data is packaged, addressed, transmitted, 
routed, and received. See Vinton Cerf & Robert Kahn, A Protocol for Packet 
Network Intercommunication, 5 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637 (1974). 
 63 INTERNET SOCIETY, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: AN OVERVIEW – 
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF A MORE CONNECTED WORLD 
(Oct. 2015), http://g3ict.org/download/p/fileId_1031/productId_340. 
 64 Examples of market-based interactions include: 1) videogame platforms 
(such as Sony PlayStation, Microsoft X-Box, Nintendo) that act as intermediary 
between gamers (platform buyers) and game developers; 2) payment card 
operates act as intermediaries between cardholder (buyer of goods and services) 
and merchants who accept the intermediaries’ payment platform to settle 
transactions; and 3) online auctions sites (such as eBay) that match buyers and 
sellers of goods and services. Examples of non-market interactions include: 1) 
social media sites (such as Facebook) who connect two or more individuals in 
social contexts and 2) dating platforms that match individuals looking for 
relationships. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in 
Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 992 (2003). 
 65 JOVAN KURBALIJA, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNET GOVERNANCE (5th ed. 
2012). 
 66 Norman Bowie & Karim Jamal, Privacy Rights on the Internet: Self-
Regulation or Government Regulation?, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 323, 330 (2006). 
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outpaced social norms and legal structures in terms of acceptable 
practices, especially in the field of privacy.67 
Markets consisting of intermediaries that create and operate 
platforms designed to directly connect two (or more) parties in 
market and non-market interactions are called two-sided (or multi-
sided) markets.68 The literature on two-sided markets refines the 
research examining demand-side scale economies; the notion is 
that a good or service’s value to one individual depends on the 
number of other users.69 The two-sided market literature examines 
how distinct users of an intermediary’s economic platform confer 
network effects on one another by facilitating direct interaction 
between the distinct users.70 Online advertising, price aggregating, 
and comparison sites are examples of two-sided, or multi-sided, 
markets.71 
                                                
 67 Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-
and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/. 
 68 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 990. 
 69 Demand-side scale economies are also identified as network effects or 
network externalities. The classic example of a product exhibiting demand-side 
scale economies is the telephone: the value of telephones is a function of the 
number of other individuals with a telephone. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 
133–136 (Spring 1994). Demand-side scale economies can be positive or 
negative. Congestion is an example of a negative network externality: the value 
of the good or service is less valuable as users’ consumption increase. A positive 
feedback loop, or bandwagon effect, is an example of a positive network effect: 
the value of a good or service increase as buyers’ consumption increases. 
 70 The network effects in two-sided markets can be both same-side and cross-
side effects, and either positive or negative. See Andrei Hagiu, Strategic 
Decisions for Multisided Platforms, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://tribunecontentagency.com/article/strategic-decisions-for-multisided-
platforms/ (explaining that the network effects in two-sided markets can be both 
same-side and cross-side effects, and either positive or negative). 
 71 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 991–92. 
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A. An Introduction to Online Tracking Technologies and 
Advertising: How Personal and Non-Personal Information Is 
Exchanged for “Free” Health-Related Internet Content 
According to comScore’s MediaMetrix®, an American media 
and data analytics company, ranking “fifty-six of the top 100 
websites based on page views in February 2008 presented 
advertising,” suggesting that online advertising is a significant 
source of revenue for many web property owners.72 In 2016, many 
of the same web property owners remain on comScore 
MediaMetrix’s Top 50 Properties and likely continue to derive 
significant revenue from advertising.73 In 2008, the only directly 
health-related web property on comScore’s Top 100 list was 
AthenaHealth.com (ranked 88).74 WebMD75 Health ranked 33rd on 
comScore’s Top 50 Properties list in February 2016 with over 
twenty-eight million unique visitors from desktop devices.76 
Online advertising consists of intermediary operators of 
platforms designed to coordinate the matching problem of 
delivering advertisers’ messages to many potential consumers. 
There is no single mode or form of online advertising.77 Indeed, 
online advertising can take the form of email campaigns, search 
                                                
 72 David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, 
and Privacy, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 37 (2009). 
 73 comScore Ranks the Top 50 U.S. Digital Media Properties for February 2016, 
COMSCORE (March 21, 2016), https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Rankings/ 
comScore-Ranks-the-Top-50-US-Digital-Media-Properties-for-February-2016 
(listing websites and their ranks based on the number of unique viewers). 
 74 Evans, supra note 72 at 41. iVillage.com: The Women’s Network also 
provides some health-related content relevant to primarily women, but also 
provides much broader media content of interest to women. 
 75 WebMD is an online content provider that publishes health news and information 
to the public. See generally What We Do for Our Users, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-what-we-do-for-our-users (last 
updated April 29, 2014); Advertising Policy, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/about-
webmd-policies/about-advertising-policy (last updated June 9, 2016); Privacy Policy, 
WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-privacy-policy (last 
updated Dec. 30, 2016). 
 76 See comScore, supra note 73 (noting that this number rises to 72.5 million 
unique visitors/viewer from both desktop and mobile devices). 
 77 Evans, supra note 72, at 38. 
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engine marketing, social media marketing, or display ads.78 While 
advertisers are eager to deliver messages, consumers vary 
considerably in their willingness to receive online advertising.79 
Thus, effectively targeting online advertisements requires website 
owners to attract a large number of potential consumers with a 
wide variety of behavioral patterns to best leverage the variety of 
advertising delivery techniques.80 
Many display-ad online advertising platform models exist. 
Website owners that deliver content directly can publish 
advertising with their content and act as an intermediary 
connecting advertising suppliers—like an advertising agency—to 
potential consumers. This is an example of the website owner 
using first-party tracking technologies to understand its users’ 
behavior on its own web pages. In this scenario, website owners 
typically source advertisements from an advertising agency’s 
servers and display ads alongside the website owner’s content. 
This is an example of a two-sided market.81 
More complex display-ad models exist and include different 
economic agents. For example, display-ad space may be allocated 
via auction using an ad exchange, which is a technology platform 
that hosts advertising inventory from multiple ad networks and 
facilitates real-time bidding between buyers and sellers for display 
ads.82 Specifically, when a user visits a web property owner’s 
pages, a user’s personal and non-personal information and a 
request to fill a blank ad space are then transferred to the 
publisher’s ad server.83 The user’s information and ad-space-for-
sale offer are submitted to supply-side ad servers, and the user’s 
                                                
 78 See id. at 39–40 (analyzing revenues of different online advertising 
formats). 
 79 See id. at 39 (“Nevertheless, certain features of the ‘online advertising 
ecosystem’ have become clear. On one side of the business are advertisers that 
want to reach consumers. On the other side are consumers who may or may not 
be receptive to receiving advertising messages.”). 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. at 38. 
 82 INTERNET ADVERTISING BUREAU, How an Ad is Served with Real Time 
Bidding (RTB) – IAB Digital Simplified, YOUTUBE (June 19, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Glgi9RRuJs. 
 83 Id. 
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information is submitted to a data-management platform where it 
is connected to demographic information, such as previous 
purchase behavior and other information used by advertisers.84 The 
user’s information and ad-space offer are bundled into an offer, 
returned to the supply-side platform, and sent to an ad exchange.85 
Then the ad exchange submits the offer on demand-side 
platforms.86 Bidders on the demand-side platforms—typically 
acting on behalf of ad agencies—receive the bundled ad offer 
supplied by the web property owner and supply-side server and 
decide how much to bid for the ad space.87 According to the 
Internet Advertising Bureau, the demand-side platform has about 
ten milliseconds to respond to an offer.88 Once the winning bid is 
accepted through the ad exchange, both parties are notified of the 
transaction, and the ad exchange sends the ad link back through the 
supply-side platform to the web property owner’s ad server and 
ultimately to the user’s browser.89 In this process, a web property 
owner uses personal and non-personal information about the user 
accessing its pages; this is an example of third-party tracking 
technology.90 
To examine the manifestation of online advertising, let us 
revisit Pamela’s situation. Her internet search about high 
cholesterol might lead her to the popular information content 
provider WebMD, depicted in Figure 1. 
                                                
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 INTERNET ADVERTISING BUREAU, supra note 82. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 The Murky World of Third Party Web Tracking, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 12, 
2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/530741/the-murky-world-of-third-
party-web-tracking/. 
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Figure 1: Screenshot of WebMD’s Cholesterol and 
Triglycerides Health Center Content Page91 
The page contains lots of useful information on high 
cholesterol, triglycerides, and other health-related content. Under 
the “Cholesterol Health Check” section is a statement of the health 
ramifications of high cholesterol and general treatments for 
abnormal levels of cholesterol.92 WebMD also provides links to 
“Latest Headlines” and “Top Stories” related to cholesterol and 
other health-related content under the “Today On WebMD.”93 To 
fund this content at no cost to consumers, WebMD sells 
advertising space alongside the free content.94 For example, in 
Figure 1, the LDL-lowering cholesterol statin Repatha® is 
advertised in two locations on the page.95 How WebMD’s pages 
source the advertising may have significant implications on health-
related consumer privacy. 
                                                
 91 Id. 
 92 See fig. 1. 
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. 
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One possibility is that WebMD is a first-party advertiser and 
sources its own advertising directly from advertisers. Under this 
scenario, WebMD directly interfaces with advertisers and avoids 
advertising through other intermediaries. While WebMD may 
collect personal and non-personal information, the information is 
not connected to third-party demographic data nor linked to an 
individual user. Instead, the WebMD pages populate advertising 
based on the personal and non-personal user information it 
collected from the user’s account profile and with first-party 
tracking tools as a user views WebMD’s health-related content and 
pages.96 
Another possibility is that WebMD could source its advertising 
through an ad exchange, which is a third-party intermediary that 
uses a technology platform to facilitate buying and selling of 
online advertising from multiple ad networks.97 Prices for these ads 
are determined through an auction using a bidding process.98 When 
WebMD offers to sell an ad space, it bundles the ad offer along 
with consumer information and submits it to the ad exchange.99 
Third-party advertisers can use the user’s personal and non-
personal information along with third-party tracking technologies 
to identify the demographics of the ad recipient (consumer of 
content) with high probability and connect this information search 
to the ad recipient. 
                                                
 96 WebMD Privacy Policy, WEBMD (Sept. 16, 2017), 
http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-privacy-policy. 
 97 The major ad exchanges include: AppNexus, AOL’s Marketplace, 
DoubleClick (a subsidiary of Google since 2008), Microsoft’s Ad Exchange, 
OpenX, Rubicon Project Exchange, and Smaato. WebMD places no restrictions 
on the types of advertising in which it can engage. Advertising Policy, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-advertising-policy. Since 
ad exchanges are a form of third-party tracking, this is a possibility, (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2017). Third-Party Ad Server, KNOW ONLINE ADVERTISING, 
http://www.knowonlineadvertising.com/advertisingdictionary/third-party-ad-
server/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
 98 Ad Exchange Auction Model, DOUBLECLICK, https://support.google.com/ 
adxbuyer/answer/6077702?hl=en (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
 99 See WebMD Privacy Policy, supra note 96 (explaining the technical details 
of how a blank ad space gets populated using the ad exchange is described in the 
previous paragraphs). 
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A review of WebMD’s Privacy Policy reveals that it may 
collect “personal and non-personal information.”100 These forms of 
information are used in a variety of ways, but include: “statistically 
analyze user behavior and activity” and “provide you and other 
people with similar demographic characteristics and interests with 
more relevant content and advertisements.”101 The policy also 
discloses that “[w]e [WebMD] may combine Personal and Non-
Personal Information collected by WebMD about you, and may 
combine this information with information from external sources. 
Third parties may also use Non-Personal Information in order to 
display advertising that reflects the interests and preferences of our 
community.”102 Individuals who prefer that Personal Information 
not be used by WebMD can: 1) “opt out” of registering with the 
WebMD community; 2) set browser software to reject Cookies; or 
3) “opt out” of Cookies advertisers by visiting the Network 
Advertising Initiative gateway opt-out site.103 
A review of WebMD Network’s Advertising Policy shows that 
it accepts advertising from third parties.104 In addition to providing 
more general advertising guidelines around the discretion for 
determining types of advertising displayed and categories of 
advertisements it will knowingly exclude, WebMD specifies that it 
uses “Ads by Google” to source “[a]dvertisements that have been 
purchased by companies that want to have links to their websites 
appear adjacent to search results in response to specific terms.”105 
An important implication is that health-related information 
content providers produce and distribute health-related content that 
is “freely” available to users.106 To generate revenue, content 
                                                
 100 “Personal information” includes: an individual’s name, address, telephone 
number, email address, and health information. Id. “Non-personal information” 
includes: cookies, web beacons, WebMD mobile device applications, and data 
from external sources. Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See Advertising Policy, supra note 75. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Some content may require the user to provide profile information in a user 
account. Thus, “freely” means there is no explicit monetary transaction, but the 
user does give up some personal information in exchange for the information 
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providers sell advertising and collect personally and non-
personally identifiable information to improve the advertising 
targeting and efficiency.107 While content providers and website 
owners often have explicit privacy and advertising policies, most 
users are likely unaware of how their personal and non-personal 
information is used.108 Opt-out style privacy and advertising 
policies contribute to the sense of “freely” available content 
without fully understanding that personally identifiable and non-
personally identifiable information implicitly is exchanged for 
health-related content and other goods and services on the 
Internet.109 
B. Internet Technology and Economic Incentives: Price 
Discrimination 
A firm with some degree of market power has an incentive to 
design price strategies that enhance its profitability. This often 
leads a firm to charge different prices for identical or seemingly 
identical goods and services in different markets, a practice known 
as price discrimination.110 While multiple forms of price 
discrimination exist, traditionally the strategies are divided into 
three categories: 1) first degree—charging each consumer her 
reservation price;111 2) second degree—practice of posting a 
schedule of declining prices to consumers with different demand 
                                                                                                         
content. See John Gallaugher, Pat Auger & Anat Barnir, Revenue Streams and 
Digital Content Providers: An Empirical Investigation, 38 INFO. & MGMT. 1, 7 
(2001) (discussing the exchange of personal information for content in the 
context of “freely” available web content). 
 107 See Evans, supra note 72, at 37–56. 
 108 See Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-
state-of-privacy-in-america/ (discussing a Pew Research study finding that 47 
percent of “Americans struggle to understand the nature and scope of data 
collected about them”). 
 109 See id. 
 110 HAL R. VARIAN, Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Richard D. Willig eds., 1989). 
 111 A “reservation price” is the upper limit on the price a consumer would pay 
for a good or service. See Ian Steedman, Reservation Price and Reservation 
Demand, 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 5537–38 
(1987). 
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but cannot associate buyers and their demand to permit buyers to 
self-select what to purchase; a classic example is a providing a 
menu of prices for different quantities or qualities; and 3) third 
degree—charging different prices to different consumer groups.112 
Each form of price discrimination varies in terms of profitability 
and information needed to implement the strategies. 
Price discrimination is not a new practice and has been 
successfully and unsuccessfully implemented in both online and 
traditional markets. Airlines successfully engage in second-degree 
price discrimination in traditional markets by charging different 
prices for first-class and coach seats and by charging different 
prices for the same seat according to how far in advance a ticket is 
booked from its departure date.113 In 1999, the Coca-Cola 
Company tested a variable-price Coke machine. Essentially, the 
Coca-Cola Company designed a vending machine that can adjust 
prices based on demand in current market conditions; for example, 
price adjustment could be positively correlated with the outside 
temperature or negatively correlated with the time of day and foot 
traffic.114 Despite resting on sound economic principles, Coke’s 
variable-price vending machine was met with public disdain as 
angry Coke drinkers voiced their opinions in Internet chat rooms 
and newspaper editorials around the world, which led Coke to 
abandon widespread adoption of the “innovation.”115 
As tracking technologies become increasingly sophisticated, 
online retailers increasingly are exploring and using different 
forms of price discrimination. Amazon, for example, uses first- and 
third-party tracking technologies to engage in price 
                                                
 112 See MICHAEL R. BAYE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
STRATEGY 404–410 (5th ed. 2017). 
 113 See Tejvan Pettinger, Airline Price Discrimination, ECON. HELP BLOG 
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7767/business/airline-price-
discrimination/. 
 114 Constance L. Hays, Variable-Price Coke Machine Being Tested, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/28/business/variable-
price-coke-machine-being-tested.html. 
 115 David Leonhardt, Why Variable Pricing Fails at the Vending Machine, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/27/business/why-
variable-pricing-fails-at-the-vending-machine.html?_r=0. 
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discrimination.116 When a consumer makes a purchase from 
Amazon or one of its affiliates, Amazon collects a name, address, 
email, phone number, credit card number, IP address, browser 
type, operating system, purchase history and other information and 
uses it in a variety of ways. 
On the upside, Amazon has designed a platform that enables 
personalized shopping experiences for its customers by giving 
them the ability to create “wish lists,” access other customer 
reviews for products, and recommend products through the 
“Recommended for You” feature, among other features.117 
Amazon’s data-rich consumer database is the basis for Amazon’s 
Advertising Platform, which connects advertisers to Amazon 
shoppers on Amazon’s web properties as well as across the 
Internet and on mobile apps.118 These are examples of second-
degree price discrimination and, in general, appear to be designed 
to provide Amazon customers with a more personal experience.119 
Data collected using first-party tracking technologies, namely 
transactions and cookies, are the primary driver behind these 
personalized shopping experiences. 
However, despite these upsides to consumers increasingly 
sophisticated tracking technologies facilitate the use of something 
closer to first-degree price discrimination, or dynamic pricing, 
based on personal and non-personal information. In September 
2000, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos admitted the company charged 
significantly different prices for the same DVDs in a “randomized 
price test.”120 More recently, lawsuits filed against Amazon alleged 
                                                
 116 See Jakub Mikians et al., Detecting Price and Search Discrimination on the 
Internet, HOTNETS-XI PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ACM WORKSHOPS ON HOT 
TOPICS IN NETWORKS, 80–82 (2012), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2390245. 
 117 Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/ 
gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496#examples (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
 118 See id. 
 119 See Mikians et al., supra note 116, at 80–82. 
 120 Anita Ramasastry, Web Sites Change Prices Based on Customers’ Habits, 
CNN INT’L (June 24, 2005), http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ 
ramasastry.website.prices/. At least one customer reported that Amazon offered 
a significantly lower DVD price after he deleted cookies identifying himself as a 
“regular” Amazon customer. Id. Bezos’ admission of the “randomized pricing 
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that Amazon Prime’s “free” shipping is not free since Amazon 
Prime members are charged high base prices to cover shipping 
costs.121 
Notwithstanding pending litigation, there is nothing inherently 
illegal about Amazon’s price discrimination efforts; firms in other 
markets have similar practices.122 Most markets currently do not 
have restrictions on what personal and non-personal information 
can be collected and shared. An exception is how personal and 
non-personal health-related information is collected, stored, and 
shared as described in HIPAA. As explained more fully in Part IV, 
this raises the question whether the spirit, if not the letter of 
HIPAA, may be violated in markets using a two-sided platform, 
like a third-party ad exchange platform or other platforms using 
third-party tracking technologies. 
Incentives for firms to engage in price discrimination may lead 
to health-related data collection, storage, aggregation, and sharing 
practices. For example, suppose our hypothetical patient, Pamela, 
decides in consultation with her doctor to treat her condition with a 
combination of diet, exercise, and medication. While browsing 
WebMD, Pamela saw an advertisement for Repatha, a drug that 
treats high cholesterol by lowering LDL. She mentions Repatha to 
her doctor, and they agree on the appropriate treatment for her 
specific case. To explore the cost of her proposed Repatha 
                                                                                                         
test – ‘mistake’” included: 1) a statement that Amazon would offer to refund the 
6,896 high-paying customers the difference between the price paid and the 
lowest price during the period, an amount totaling about $21,377.60, see id., and 
2) that Amazon did not and never will use consumer demographic data as a basis 
for test prices, Michael J. Martinez, Amazon Error May End Dynamic Pricing, 
ABC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ 
story?id=119399&page=1. Note, personal and non-personal information are 
different from consumer demographic data. See id. 
 121 See Jennifer Abel, Lawsuit Alleges Amazon Charges Prime Members for “Free” 
Shipping, CONSUMER AFF. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/ 
news/lawsuit-alleges-amazon-charges-prime-members-for-free-shipping-031414.html; 
Tricia Duryee, Lawsuit Alleges Amazon Prime Third-Party Prices Are Inflated to 
Cover Shipping, GEEK WIRE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/lawsuit-
alleges-amazon-prime-third-party-prices-inflated-cover-shipping/. 
 122 See John Spacey, 10 Examples of Price Discrimination, SIMPLICABLE (Jan. 
12, 2016), http://simplicable.com/new/price-discrimination. 
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treatment, Pamela visits www.GoodRx.com, which is a price 
comparison intermediary (price aggregator) that lists prices of 
different pharmaceutical retailers on its platform. As an 
intermediary, GoodRx provides price information on various firms 
for a broad variety of pharmaceutical products thereby facilitating 
transactions between potential consumers (in consultations with 
their doctors) and retail pharmaceutical sellers through the use of 
coupons on its platform.123 Pharmaceutical consumers can use 
GoodRx for “free” to access drug price information and coupons.124 
GoodRx generates revenue by charging referral fees and selling 
advertising.125 
A search for Repatha on www.GoodRx.com results in the 
webpage shown in Figure 2. 
                                                
 123 How GoodRx Works, GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/how-goodrx-
works (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). According to GoodRx’s Privacy Policy, the 
company does not collect any personal information from users unless a visitor 
“register[s] to receive certain services,” such as price alerts, coupons and 
discount cards. Privacy Policy, GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/privacy-
policy (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). There are options that require a user to 
provide an email address, phone number, and/or name and mailing address. Id. 
GoodRx also uses cookie technology “[t]o collect, store and sometimes track 
information for statistical purposes to improve the service we provide.” Id. 
Additional information collected with cookies includes: 1) locational 
information, 2) drug information accessed while visiting www.goodrx.com, and 
3) third-party websites a user visited before accessing www.goodrx.com. Id. 
User information collected via cookies is retained for 30 days and is associated 
with the user’s account information, if an account exists. Id. While GoodRx’s 
cookies do not enable third parties to access personally identifiable information, 
visiting other websites may require the user to accept a third-party cookie. Id. 
GoodRx claims they do not control the use of any third-party cookies deposited 
from other websites, and “expressly disclaim[s] responsibility for information 
collected through them [third-party websites].” Id. 
 124 How GoodRx Works, GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/how-goodrx-
works (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
 125 Id. There is no description that reveals whether GoodRx engages in first-
party or third-party advertising practices. 
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Figure 2: Screenshot of GoodRx’s Webpage for Retailers’ 
Prices and Coupons for the Cholesterol-Lowering Drug, Repatha 
There are options for our 40-year-old woman to set her location 
by zip code and sign in to the GoodRx website. Doing either of 
these could permit the companies to charge different prices by zip 
code or based on other personally or non-personally identifiable 
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information.126 A user entering neither piece of information results 
in a price range between $1,148.66 and $1,207.69 before discounts 
for two syringes (1 ml) of Repatha 140mg/ml. An open question is 
whether GoodRx permits pharmaceutical retailers to engage in any 
form of first-degree, price discrimination based on information 
collected from consumers on its website. That is, whether each 
consumer sees a different set of prices based on their personal and 
consumer information. GoodRx’s current privacy policy suggests 
that information is not shared unless to facilitate a requested 
transaction.127 However, the technology exists to engage in this 
behavior, and absent legislation that delineates boundaries on the 
management of this health-related information, consumers are left 
to rely on individual website’s privacy policies, which can, and 
often do, evolve. 
To reinforce the speculation that GoodRx has the technical 
capability to engage in price discrimination, consider the 
following. A 2016 NPR interview revealed how machine-based 
algorithms used by the Princeton Review resulted in significantly 
different online SAT course prices across the nation: prices 
ranging from $6,600 to $8,400.128 Asians were almost twice as 
likely as non-Asians to be charged higher prices for the Princeton 
Review’s online SAT preparation course.129 Although it was 
unclear whether Asians were charged higher prices because they 
were Asian or because they lived in certain zip codes that are 
                                                
 126 Prices and Coupons for 2 Syringes (1ml) of Repatha 140mg/ml, GOODRX, 
https://www.goodrx.com/repatha?drug-name=repatha (last visited Sept. 17, 
2017). Currently, a review of four or five different zip codes does not suggest 
that individual retailers listing prices on GoodRx charge different prices; 
however, different retailers are available in different zip codes so the price range 
varies. 
 127 See Privacy Policy, supra note 124. 
 128 ProPublica Reveals Discriminatory Pricing by Computer Algorithms, NPR 
(Oct. 19, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/19/498582157/ 
propublica-reveals-discriminatory-pricing-by-computer-algorithms. 
 129 See id. 
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predominantly Asian, the Princeton Review indicated that the 
discrimination against Asians was not intentional.130 
Independent of current industry practices, Parts I and II suggest 
that it is technologically feasible to indiscriminately collect 
personal and non-personal information. Furthermore, strong 
economic motivations exist to collect, store, aggregate, and 
transfer personal and non-personal information that can be linked 
back to other demographic information. The result: indiscriminate 
data collection can lead to health-related information being used to 
identify individuals. Moral and ethical issues aside, this type of 
indiscriminate data collection raises significant privacy concerns—
especially in the realm of health-related information. In Part III, we 
explore whether there are legal protections available to protect 
unsuspecting users from this data collection, storage, aggregation, 
and sharing. 
III. LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 
Data aggregation of information obtained from a computer 
user’s search history (as opposed to volunteering information or 
transactional data) arguably catches the consumer unaware. Would 
the consumer in the opening scenario be surprised to learn how her 
search for cardiac information was being used, or even that it was 
being used at all? While such information is valuable to businesses 
for ad-revenue generation, better ad targeting, or price 
discrimination as explained above, how far does and should the 
protection of business’ economic interests go vis-a-vis consumers? 
The United States has taken a rather ad hoc approach to data 
privacy. Those federal statutes that do exist target specific 
industries such as healthcare, communications, education, financial 
services, and online data collection regarding minors.131 Aside from 
some enforcement actions by the FTC and a smattering of state 
laws, industry best practices shaped and enforced by company 
                                                
 130 Id. It should be noted that although the Princeton Review seemed to draw 
lines for their zip code pricing in a way that encompassed primarily high-income 
areas, also included in this group were many low-income Asians areas. Id. 
 131 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 50, at 6. 
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privacy officers and other privacy professionals are the primary 
influence of standards of privacy protection.132 
A. The Historical Roots of Privacy Protection 
The ancient, classical Greek133 notion of privacy as a state of 
deprivation was turned on its head beginning during the Middle 
Ages134 and gained momentum with the explosion of individual 
rights ideas developed by John Locke and others.135 Political 
philosophers invoked the concept of private, as opposed to public, 
spheres of life “as a way to limit state power and to legitimate the 
concept of private property.”136 Such a public/private sphere 
differentiation had obvious and profound influences on the framers 
of the U.S. Constitution, evident in the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated but upon probable cause . . . .”137 The 
text of the Fourth Amendment embodies the two stated privacy 
concerns Constitutional framers had: (1) that Fourth Amendment 
privacy addresses rights of the private citizen against government 
intrusion; and (2) that Fourth Amendment privacy deals with 
limitations on physical or spatial intrusion by the government. 
While these remain an underpinning for modern-day privacy 
                                                
 132 Id. 
 133 Ironically, privacy in ancient civilizations was based on a “sense of 
impoverishment and exclusion,” according to noted architectural historian 
Joseph Rykwert in his article Privacy in Antiquity, 68 SOC. RES. 29, 31 (2001). 
The Ancient Greeks thought that “service to the polis or city-state, was the 
highest calling.” Winch, supra note 15, at 200. In fact, the word for privacy in 
Ancient Greek, idion (not coincidentally the root for idiot) “referred to that 
which separates one out from the unity of the community, the humanity of the 
polis.” Id. at 201. Hannah Arendt noted: “the privative trait of privacy, indicated 
in the word itself, was all-important: it meant literally a state of being deprived 
of something . . . [a] man who lived only a private life who – like the slave – 
was not permitted to enter the public realm or . . . was not fully human.” 
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38 (2nd ed. 1958). 
 134 Winch, supra note 15, at 200. 
 135 David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant 
Requirement, 96 B.U.L. REV. 425, 450 (2016). 
 136 Id. 
 137 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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rights, both notions of privacy and the corresponding privacy law 
have evolved considerably. 
During the founding of the United States, privacy concerns 
centered on the individual’s right to prevent intrusion by the 
government, not by other private individuals or businesses. 
Philosophical writings of the time evince this vein of thinking, 
revealing the natural reaction to an emergence from British 
imperial rule as well as with the general and long-standing 
historical division between “public” and “private” life. This was 
the backdrop for the Fourth Amendment’s protection of individuals 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and its progeny 
recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy.138 In the landmark 
case Katz v. United States,139 Justice Harlan stated in his concurring 
opinion that the Constitution protects people (not places) against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, which involves two requirements: “first that a person ha[s] 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”140 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment’s “origin and 
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the 
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a 
limitation upon other than governmental agencies.”141 
                                                
 138 For a thoughtful article evaluating and criticizing the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” standard, see generally Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable 
Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002). 
Among the flaws Professor Spencer points out are: reasonable expectations of 
privacy involve constantly-shifting expectations; it is subject to disproportionate 
influence by major businesses and powers; reasonable people could disagree as 
to their expectations of privacy; such disagreement could vary regionally, 
creating particular problems for the United States Supreme Court; and increased 
technological advancement can lead to a corresponding decrease in privacy. Id. 
 139 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 140 Id. at 361. 
 141 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Other cases have held 
that a private parties’ wrongful search and seizure does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment and, therefore, does not deprive the government of using that 
evidence lawfully received by the private party. See, e.g., United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125–26 (1984); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1223, 
1225 (Utah 1988) (finding that the informant was not acting as a government 
agent when he searched the defendant’s premises, the Supreme Court of Utah 
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The extensive line of Fourth Amendment cases deciding what 
constitutes unreasonable search and seizure is of limited 
applicability here. While it is tempting to utilize definitions of (and 
glean examples of) reasonable expectations of privacy from these 
cases, potential privacy intrusions by the government are not 
analogous to potential privacy intrusions by business. The history 
behind and rationale for limiting governmental intrusion (and the 
accompanying harms to individuals and society) do not parallel the 
history, rationale, ethical considerations, or type of injury 
experienced by consumers when businesses profile their health-
related data in detail based on online searches and the like. Statutes 
and cases decided in the context of consumer information provide 
far more relevant guidance.142 
The historical development of the right to be free from certain 
types of non-governmental intrusion stems largely from the 
thoughtful and influential work The Right to Privacy.143 Giving the 
modern reader an eerie sense of déjà vu, Warren and Brandeis 
reveal that their motivation and determination in writing an article 
to advance privacy theory was: technological advancement. 
Writing in 1890, they asserted that one justification for expanding 
certain privacy rights beyond situations where courts could identify 
breach of contract or breach of confidence/trust type theories was 
“now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the 
                                                                                                         
upheld defendant’s conviction). In Jacobsen, Federal Express personnel 
discovered a package that had been accidentally torn open by a forklift. 466 U.S. 
at 111. Upon examining the contents, consistent with written company policy 
and necessary for insurance purposes, they became suspicious and contacted the 
Drug Enforcement Administration. Id. The contents, it turns out, were cocaine. 
Id. The United States Supreme Court held that “federal agents did not infringe 
any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been 
frustrated as the result of private conduct.” Id. at 126. In Watts, an unidentified 
informant met a police officer near the defendant’s home and pointed out to the 
officer a shed located on the defendant’s property and voiced suspicions as to 
the shed’s use for the cultivation of marijuana. 750 P.2d at 1220. Upon returning 
to the premises with a warrant and finding no one home, police searched the 
shed and seized material which ultimately proved to be marijuana. Id. 
 142 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 919 (2005). 
 143 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
OCT. 2017] Health Privacy 37 
perpetration of . . . wrongs without any participation by the injured 
party, the protection granted by the law must be placed upon a 
broader foundation.”144 
Much of this oft-cited article focuses on issues relating to the 
public revelation of facts or ideas which a person would expect to 
be confidential. In a general sense, Warren and Brandeis detailed 
the exact discomfort that many privacy advocates have complained 
of: 
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and 
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive 
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to 
the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through 
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.145 
Since Warren and Brandeis’ seminal article, rights to privacy 
protection against non-governmental individuals and entities have 
developed tremendously, at both federal and state levels.146 
B. Federal Standards 
At the federal level, some limited privacy protections are 
provided by statutory law and by the administrative efforts of the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The FTC is an independent 
federal agency with the twofold mission of (1) consumer 
protection and (2) enhancing industry competition.147 As part of its 
responsibilities, the FTC addresses a variety of practices that 
impact consumers, including those behaviors that may violate a 
consumer’s lawfully protected privacy rights.148 The FTC’s goals 
in privacy work are “to protect consumers’ personal information 
and ensure that consumers have the confidence to take advantage 
of the many benefits offered in the marketplace.”149 
                                                
 144 Id. at 211. 
 145 Id. at 196. 
 146 Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and 
Brandeis, 39 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 703 (1990). 
 147 FED. TRADE COMM’N, Privacy & Data Security Update, 1 (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2015. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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1. Federal Statutes 
Congressional curtailment of businesses’ use of consumer 
information has been driven largely by consideration of: (1) who is 
using the information and (2) what the information is about—
financial, medical, videotape, etc. Major federal legislation relating 
to businesses’ use of consumer information has been piecemeal, 
often targeting restrictions for one specific sector or industry such 
as those described below. 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”)150 applies to 
consumer reporting agencies, permitting them to release a 
consumer report only to a court, to the consumer him/herself, or to 
a person the consumer reporting agency has reason to believe 
intends to use the information for specifically enumerated purposes 
(such as evaluating the consumer’s creditworthiness for extending 
credit).151 A consumer reporting agency’s release of target 
marketing information to vendors violates the FCRA because such 
information is not necessary for lenders in their pre-screening 
process.152 
The Gramm Leach Bliley Act (“GBLA”) of 1999153 mandates 
that financial institutions take appropriate safeguards “to insure the 
security and confidentiality of customer records and 
information.”154 For these purposes, “financial institutions” include 
but are not limited to: banks, savings associations, and insurance 
providers, as well as brokers, dealers, investment companies, and 
                                                
 150 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2016). 
 151 Other purposes include the review or collection of an account of the 
consumer’s; employment purposes; underwriting insurance; eligibility for a 
license or other government-issued benefit for which investigation of the 
applicant’s financial responsibility is legally mandated; review by current or 
potential investors valuing credit risks and obligations; a legitimate business 
need for the information in connection with a business transaction initiated by 
the consumer; or a legitimate business need to review whether a consumer 
continues to meet the terms of an existing account. Id. § 1681(b). 
 152 In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 326 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ill. 
2004). 
 153 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2016). 
 154 Id. § 6801(b)(1). 
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investment advisers under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).155 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”)156 and its accompanying regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Health and Human Services157 require that 
health care providers, administrators and employees of health care 
plans, healthcare clearinghouses and health insurance companies 
protect the privacy of individually identifiable health 
information.158 HIPAA will be revisited and explored more fully in 
Part IV. 
2. Regulatory Efforts 
Since the 1990s, the FTC has been seeking ways to address 
privacy concerns regarding the data gleaned from individuals’ 
Internet activities.159 In its 2009 report, “Self-Regulatory Principles 
for Online Behavioral Advertising,” the FTC advocated self-
regulation of the industry.160 In response, leaders in the advertising 
                                                
 155 Id. § 6805(a). 
 156 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 
110 Stat. 1998 (1996). 
 157 D’Lisa Simmons, Impact of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, HOUSTON LAWYER 
(May/June 2006), http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_may06/page20.htm. See 
generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.408 (2016). 
 158 Interestingly, as argued in The HIPAA Privacy Regulation – Troubled 
Process, Troubling Results, a Special Report issued by Privacilla.org in April 
2003, Congress “punted” on the issue of privacy protection under HIPAA: 
Congress . . . wondered aloud what privacy was and how it should be 
protected . . . [and] asked the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to make recommendations to Congress about the privacy of 
individually identifiable health information [and then] told the 
Secretary of HHS to go ahead and write into law whatever the 
recommendations were if Congress did not act. 
The HIPAA Privacy Regulation – Trouble Process, Troubling Results, Privacilla.org 
(Apr. 2003), http://www.privacilla.org/releases/HIPAA_Report.html. 
 159 Courtney A. Barclay, A Comparison of Proposed Legislative Data Privacy 
Protections in the United States, 29 COMPUTER L. AND SEC. REV. 359, 360 
(2013). 
 160 FED. TRADE COMM’N, Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online 
Behavioral Advertising, Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and 
Technology (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
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industry proposed guidelines aimed at improving transparency and 
making consumers aware of privacy policies and opt-out tools.161 
Although industry leaders came together to discuss more 
transparent processes to protect consumers’ privacy, progress was 
slow. The FTC expressed displeasure with the industry’s slow pace 
toward reform and instead proposed in 2010 that a simple do-not-
track mechanism be offered to consumers to allow consumers to 
easily opt out of data protection.162 Earlier that year, the Wall Street 
Journal released an investigative series of articles, “What They 
Know,” which examined the quickly-growing business of spying 
on consumers.163 This series revealed that, on average, more than 
60 pieces of tracking technology are installed on a user’s computer 
by the most frequently used 50 websites.164 This brought concerns 
of data privacy to national attention. Testifying before Congress in 
2010, then-director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection 
David Vladeck told House members that “the Commission 
supports a more uniform and comprehensive consumer choice 
mechanism for online behavioral advertising.”165 Such an approach 
would essentially place a persistent cookie on a browser which 
would then alert websites visited whether the consumer consents to 
being tracked.166 Although the FTC called on the industry, 
specifically the World Wide Web Consortium, to help design how 
Do Not Track would work, a final workable solution was never 
                                                                                                         
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-
advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf. 
 161 Barclay, supra note 159, at 360. 
 162 FED. TRADE COMM’N, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid 




 163 Barclay, supra note 159, at 359. 
 164 Id. at 359–60. 
 165 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Testifies on Do Not Track Legislation (Dec. 2, 
2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/12/ftc-testifies-do-
not-track-legislation. 
 166 Id. 
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achieved “despite years of meetings and thousands of emails.”167 
Significantly, prominent members of the consortium group walked 
away from the Do Not Track efforts, citing frustration at the 
process.168 For example, the Digital Advertising Alliance, a 
consortium of some of the biggest ad-technology companies, 
withdrew from the group in September 2013 complaining that the 
group was not capable of developing a workable solution.169 
Consumer Watchdog, a California-based advocacy group, also 
withdrew from the Digital Advertising Alliance in 2014, concerned 
that even if standards were developed, they would only be 
voluntary and would offer no incentive for online companies to 
comply with a consumer’s Do Not Track request.170 Although the 
group ultimately released a proposed set of rules in August 2015, 
this proposal was met with criticism from members of Congress 
and from third-party ad tech companies because the proposed rules 
created a double standard that permitted Internet publishers with 
direct consumer relationships, such as Google or Facebook, to 
track customer information, but imposed stricter privacy rules on 
third-party independent ad companies.171 To date, none of the 
various pieces of Do Not Track legislation that were introduced in 
Congress have succeeded in becoming law.172 
Even if industry standards were adopted, such action would not 
ensure industry compliance. Consider, for example, Google’s 
actions in Canada. Canada’s Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”), enacted in 2000, 
mandates that targeted advertising cannot be generated through the 
                                                
 167 Dawn Chmielewski, How ‘Do Not Track’ Ended Up Going Nowhere, 
RECODE.NET (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.recode.net/2016/1/4/ 
11588418/how-do-not-track-ended-up-going-nowhere. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Do Not Track Online Act of 2015, S. 2404, 114th Cong. (2015) (sponsored 
by Senator Richard Blumenthal, D–CT); Do Not Track Online Act of 2013, S. 
418, 113th Cong. (2013) (sponsored by Senator John D. Rockefeller, D–WV); 
Do Not Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011) (sponsored by 
Senator John D. Rockefeller, D–WV). 
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use of sensitive personal data.173 Specifically, Canadian law 
Principle 4.3 states that “the knowledge and consent of the 
individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal information, except where inappropriate.”174 Principle 
4.3.6 states that “[a]n organization should generally seek express 
consent when the information is likely to be considered 
sensitive.”175 Sensitive personal data includes information about a 
person’s health.176 For information that is less sensitive, implied 
consent would generally be adequate.177 In 2012, the Canadian 
Privacy Commissioner issued behavioral guidelines, stating that 
“[i]t is inappropriate for sensitive health information to be used in 
behavioral advertising.”178 On this point, Privacy Commissioner 
Chantal Bernier stated: “As Canadians spend more and more time 
online, they create a digital trail [clickstream data] that can reveal a 
great deal about a person. Organizations such as Google must 
ensure privacy rights are respected in this complex 
environment.”179 
Operating within Canada, Google’s privacy policy explicitly 
stated that the company would not associate cookies with 
information about an individual’s health, sexual orientation, 
religion, or race.180 Despite this assurance, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada found that Google violated Canada’s 
                                                
 173 Susan Krashinsky Robertson, Google Broke Canada’s Privacy Laws with 
Targeted Health Ads, watchdog says, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 15, 2014, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/tech-news/google-broke-canadas-
privacy-laws-with-targeted-ads-regulator-says/article16343346/. 
 174 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, 
c. 5 P. 7 (Can.). 
 175 Id. at 48. 
 176 Id.; see also PIPEDA Report of Findings #2014-001 (Jan. 14, 2014), 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/ 
investigations-into-businesses/2014/pipeda-2014-001/. 
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 178 NIRICO SYSTEMS, INC., Google Breaks Privacy Laws in Canada By Using 
Sensitive Health Information, https://www.nirico.com/google-breaks-privacy-
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privacy laws through its use of targeted online advertising.181 The 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner began its investigation into 
Google’s activities in response to a consumer complaint. A 
consumer who had searched for devices for sleep apnea noticed 
that even when he was on other sites, ads were popping up from 
Google’s AdSense promoting similar devices.182 If Google acted 
contrary to Canadian privacy laws and contrary to its own stated 
privacy policy, how much more skeptical should we be of a search 
engine’s ability to respect privacy rights when the primary 
motivator is merely self-regulation? 
In 2012, President Obama introduced the Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights “as a blueprint for privacy in the information age.”183 
The purpose of this action was to offer consumers guidance on the 
expectations that companies and individuals handling consumers’ 
personal information should meet.184 He urged Congress to pass 
legislation codifying the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights that 
would allow both the FTC and state attorneys general to enforce 
the rule’s mandates.185 The proposal also recommended a safe 
harbor provision that would allow companies to utilize their own 
company code of conduct as a means of compliance with the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, as long as such code was 
approved by the FTC.186 Congress never enacted the Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights, and now with the change in administration, 
the bill has been moved off the Whitehouse.gov website and into 
the White House archives. These efforts were, however, a step in 
the right direction and will be revisited in Part V. 
In October 2016, the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) issued new rules that limited Internet service providers’ 
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(“ISPs”) use of customer data.187 The executive director of the 
Center for Digital Democracy called the rule adoption “the best 
day we’ve had on Internet privacy—commercial Internet 
privacy—maybe ever.”188 Under the new requirements, Internet 
providers had to obtain a user’s consent before using information 
or sharing information with third parties.189 The rules were 
designed to apply to Internet providers but not to other companies 
such as Google and Facebook.190 As a result, critics of the new 
regulations complained that “[t]here is no lawful, factual, or sound 
policy basis to justify a discriminatory approach that treats ISPs 
differently from some of the largest companies in the Internet 
ecosystem that engage in similar practices.”191 In fact, in the first 
half of 2016, Facebook and Google combined accounted for 70% 
of online advertising, and together they were responsible for nearly 
all the 2016 growth in online advertising.192 However, before the 
FTC’s new rules could go into effect, they were repealed by 
Congress in March 2017.193 
C. State Efforts 
The federal government’s piecemeal approach to consumer 
privacy and failure to provide comprehensive reform has led some 
to look to the states for online privacy protection. Some states have 
looked no further than their state constitution for consumer privacy 
protection. In some cases, state statutes or state common law help 
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protect consumer privacy. We examine the relevant state landscape 
in this section. 
1. State Constitutions 
Beyond the Fourth Amendment federal constitutional 
protection of privacy from government intrusion, some states 
specifically provide a measure of privacy against private, non-
government entities. California,194 Hawaii,195 and Illinois196 
guarantee privacy rights specifically in the text of their 
constitutions. Some other states’ constitutions grant a right to 
privacy that applies only to state actions, such as Alaska,197 
Arizona,198 Florida,199 Louisiana,200 and South Carolina.201 Yet other 
                                                
 194 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and 
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”). 
 195 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized 
and shall not be infringed without a showing of a compelling state interest . . . 
“); Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94–01 (1994) (revealing that one of the purposes 
intended by the Hawaiian legislature was to guard against “possible abuses in 
the use of highly personal and intimate information in the hands of the 
government or private parties.”) (emphasis added). 
 196 In In re Minor, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted that “[i]t is clear from 
the debates in the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention that . . . . [Illinois’ 
constitutional right to privacy] was intended to protect an individual’s privacy 
from invasions or injuries caused by another nongovernmental individual or 
company.” In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (Ill. 1992). 
 197 See Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282 (Alaska 2004) (holding that a 
grocery store clerk’s right to privacy under the Alaska constitution had not been 
infringed because there was no state action). 
 198 See Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 460 P.2d 666, 669 (Ariz. 1969) 
(denying that the Arizona constitutional right to privacy gives rise to a private 
cause of action between private individuals); see also ARIZ. CONST ART. II, § 8 
(right to privacy). 
 199 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to be let alone 
and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life . . .”). 
 200 LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be secure in his person, 
property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”). 
 201 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
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states’ constitutions extend the right to privacy only to voter 
registration-related issues.202 
Several California cases help illustrate the circumstances under 
which successful consumer privacy actions brought under state 
constitutional provisions against non-government parties. In 
Pioneer Electronics v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,203 
the plaintiff bought an allegedly defective DVD player from 
Pioneer Electronics.204 In seeking to bring suit on his own behalf 
and on behalf of others similarly situated, he asked through 
discovery request for identifying information about others who had 
complained about this particular DVD model.205 Pioneer responded 
that it could not disclose the names because to do so would violate 
the California state constitutional right to privacy.206 Ultimately, 
the California Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court’s order requiring Pioneer to convey information on the 
customers who had purchased its DVD players and held that 
requiring the customers to opt-out would be sufficient.207 In its 
rationale, the court relied on a three-part test: (1) would the 
customers have expected their information to be confidential 
unless they affirmatively opted out; (2) was there serious invasion 
of privacy in releasing the information; and (3) the interests of the 
plaintiff in wanting to learn the data is weighed against the 
possibility of customers failing to receive the opt-out notice and 
objecting to the data’s release.208 In brief, the California state 
constitutional privacy provision only protects an individual’s 
expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.209 
In 2011, the California Court of Appeals re-visited the topic of 
consumer privacy rights under the California Constitution. In Los 
                                                                                                         
particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be seized, 
and the information to be obtained”). 
 202 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. LI, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 11. 
 203 150 P.3d 198 (Cal. 2007). 
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 208 Id. at 205–06. 
 209 Id. at 207. 
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Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center v. Superior Court,210 the court 
made a critical distinction between general consumer information 
(as in the DVD player customers) and health-related consumer 
data.211 In that case, a health center servicing gay, lesbian and 
transgender people in Los Angeles accidentally administered 
bicillin C-R instead of bicillin L-A medication to about 663 
patients who were suspected to have syphilis.212 Some patients who 
had been treated with the wrong medication brought suit against 
the Center and during discovery requested a list of all the other 
patients who had been similarly treated with the wrong 
medication.213 
Relying on the California Constitution’s right to privacy, the 
California Appeals Court held that, in contrast to the Pioneer case, 
such a list could not be released.214 Applying the test articulated in 
Pioneer, the court distinguished between health information and 
general consumer information215 and stated: 
The class members’ medical records are private . . . . [P]laintiffs have a 
reasonable expectation in the privacy of their medical information at 
the Center given the extremely sensitive nature of the information 
contained in them (sexually transmitted disease, possible HIV status, 
and sexual orientation) . . . [and] the proposed invasion here, namely, 
disclosure to a wide array of third persons in connection with the 
litigation, is serious in nature, scope and potential impact. Thus, we 
must balance the competing interests at stake here—the benefits of 
efficient litigation where disclosure does not require the class members’ 
consent and class-wide recovery against the Center versus the class 
members’ interest in controlling how this sensitive information is 
disseminated.216 
In addition to the protection afforded under some states’ 
constitutions, some states have enacted statutes affording privacy 
rights against non-governmental entities. For example, 
Massachusetts General Law provides that “[a] person shall have a 
right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with 
                                                
 210 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 169 (2011). 
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his privacy.”217 In a class action suit, the plaintiffs’ allegation in 
Weld v. CVS218 that CVS drug store had violated the Massachusetts 
privacy statute through the use of sharing consumers’ drug 
prescription data survived summary judgment.219 The Weld case 
dealt with the legality of a direct mailing program established by 
CVS.220 CVS sent targeted customers mailings which reminded 
them to fill prescriptions, informed them of new drugs that might 
be of interest to them, and encouraged them to discuss potential 
medical conditions with their doctors.221 The letters stated the name 
of the drug manufacturer that funded that mailing.222 CVS 
transferred all prescription information to a third party, Elensys, to 
handle the mailing logistics and Elensys in turn contracted with a 
company to physically send out the mailings.223 The CVS/Elensys 
agreement contained strict confidentiality provisions.224 
Almost immediately after the press began reporting on the 
program in February 1998, CVS terminated the program, 
presumably in response to significant negative publicity.225 But 
CVS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, decided in June 1999, 
survived on the count alleging violation of Massachusetts’s privacy 
law.226 In its decision, the court noted the plaintiffs’ complaint 
about not just the use of the information CVS had about the 
plaintiffs, but also the systematic searching of the plaintiffs’ 
prescription records.227 Such a situation could constitute a violation 
                                                
 217 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (2016). 
 218 No. 98-0897F, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 261, at 1 (Mass. June 1, 1999). 
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of privacy “that is both unreasonable and substantial or serious,” as 
required under the Massachusetts privacy statute.228 
Later, in 2007 a superior court in Massachusetts dismissed a 
plaintiff’s claim in a similar case. In Kelley v. CVS,229 CVS had an 
arrangement with Merck & Co., Inc. to mail letters that had been 
approved by Merck to CVS customers who had filled certain 
prescriptions.230 CVS identified, based on prescription records, 
which customers should receive Merck’s letters and then CVS 
again contracted Elensys (a third-party) to prepare and send letters 
to the identified customers.231 The plaintiff filled a prescription for 
diabetes medication, received one such letter,232 and sued for 
privacy rights violation.233 In sustaining the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on this count, the court found that there was no 
showing of substantial or serious interference with the plaintiff’s 
privacy.234 In part, this was because the plaintiff had already 
disclosed his diabetes condition to several people, making no 
secret of it.235 In addition, Elensys received no information from 
CVS about the plaintiff’s diagnosis or condition.236 
2. State Common Law 
States’ approaches to common law invasion of privacy lack 
uniformity. Further complicating this area of law, some states’ 
privacy legislation has preempted common law invasion of privacy 
claims.237 Traditionally, courts have referenced the four types of 
invasion of privacy actions, in line with those identified by Prosser 
in 2d Restatement of Torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of a person’s name or 
                                                
 228 Id. 
 229 No. 98-0897-BLS2, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 381 (Mass. Aug. 24, 2007). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 2. 
 233 Id. at 4. 
 234 Id. at 5. 
 235 Id. at 7. 
 236 Id. at 6. 
 237 See Weld, supra note 218, at 21 (stating that a tortious misappropriation 
claim “is probably preempted by” the Massachusetts privacy statute); see also 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (2016) (privacy statute). 
50 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 19: 1 
likeness (3) publication of private facts; and (4) publication of facts 
which place a person in a false light. Some, but not all, states 
recognize all four types of privacy invasion.238 A few jurisdictions, 
such as Massachusetts239 and Maryland,240 recognize a cause of 
action for negligent invasion of privacy, but others, like Michigan, 
require intent.241 Of the four types, only unreasonable intrusion 
upon a person’s seclusion and publication of private facts are 
potential candidates for invasion of informational consumer health 
privacy discussed here. “Publicity” in this context means 
“communicating the matter to the public at large or to so many 
persons that the matter must be regarded as one of general 
knowledge.”242 We examine cases involving online activity leading 
to the transfer of information to third parties and claims of 
intrusion on seclusion and public disclosure of private facts claims 
in this section. 
Courts have distinguished facts that are private from those that 
are personal243; a fact must be “private” to succeed under an 
invasion of privacy claim. For purposes of invasion of privacy 
claims, matters of public record, such as name, address, date of 
birth and marriage, are not private.244 In Busse v. Motorola245 a 
                                                
 238 Illinois, for example, recognizes all four types. Cooney v. Chi. Pub. 
Schs., 943 N.E.2d 23, 31–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (quoting Busse v. Motorola, 
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cellular phone customer brought a class action alleging, inter alia, 
that a cellular phone service company and others intruded on 
seclusion by transferring customers’ names, addresses, birthdates, 
social security numbers, cellular phone numbers and other 
information to a private research firm for studying a possible link 
between cell phone use and mortality. In determining only the 
element of requiring that intrusion be upon private matters, the 
Appellate Court of Illinois held that none of the information 
transferred was in fact private.246 In its interpretation of Busse, the 
court in Cooney v. Chicago Public Schools stated that the part of 
the distinction between personal information and private facts is 
that the latter are “facially embarrassing and highly offensive if 
disclosed.”247 Even household income, credit limits, credit card 
balances and credit purchase history is not necessarily “private” for 
purposes of an invasion of privacy claim of intrusion upon 
seclusion.248 
Other courts have held that social security numbers are 
private249 and that “[e]mployees’ family matters, health problems, 
and sex lives” are “clearly private.”250 If the plaintiff’s privacy 
claim is based on public disclosure of private facts, then it is also 
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necessary to show that “the intrusion would be highly offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable person.”251 
Although intrusion upon seclusion can occur in an 
informational setting, plaintiffs invoking this theory in the realm of 
consumer privacy have met little success, both in connection with 
online information and in more traditional informational settings. 
Several courts applying state law have held that the transfer of 
consumer information does not constitute an “intrusion” for 
purposes of invasion of privacy claims.252 In one case, American 
Express rented information about cardholders spending habits.253 
Before doing so, it would “rank . . . cardholders into six tiers based 
on spending habits . . . [f]or example, a cardholder may be 
characterized as ‘Rodeo Drive Chic’ or ‘Value Oriented.’ To 
characterize its cardholders, defendants analyze where they shop 
and how much they spend, and also consider behavioral 
characteristics and spending histories.”254 In this case, the 
Appellate Court of Illinois decided that these actions did not rise to 
the level of “intrusion” for invasion of privacy purposes.255 
Similarly, plaintiffs in In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy 
Litigation failed to show intrusion on seclusion when a business 
transferred consumer information to a third party.256 There, the 
defendant was a large credit reporting agency in the business of 
assembling and evaluating consumer credit information and then 
selling reports to companies considering extending credit to the 
consumer. The defendant was also in the business of selling or 
leasing ‘target marketing’ lists to catalog retailers, publication 
subscription vendors, and others using both mail and 
telemarketing.257 The marketing lists were compiled using the same 
database as the credit reporting division. The plaintiff attempted to 
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distinguish Dwyer on the grounds that the Dwyer plaintiffs 
voluntarily disclosed information directly to the defendant, 
whereas Trans Union plaintiffs did not.258 The court rejected the 
importance of this distinction, stating that plaintiffs disclosed 
information to third-party creditors who then lawfully transferred 
the information to the defendants. Further, the court stated, 
plaintiffs “do not and cannot allege that they were unaware that 
their creditors would pass this information on to Trans Union in 
the normal course of business.”259 While it may well be that 
plaintiffs knew or should have known that creditors would transfer 
their payment histories to credit reporting agencies, it does not 
follow that this knowledge equates to consent to any and all 
subsequent transfers of that information. 
Neither the Busse, Dwyer, nor the Trans Union court makes 
any mention of the aggregation aspect of the plaintiff/consumer’s 
information. The Trans Union court, in fact, seems unaware of the 
transformative power of aggregating data: “Nor are the individual 
pieces of information—names, addresses, particulars of cell phone 
use—facially revealing, compromising or embarrassing.”260 Indeed, 
individual pieces of information taken alone may have de minimis 
impact on privacy. However, does the analysis change when 
information is data-aggregated to the point where the original 
information recipient receives an entire profile that identifies a 
customer and discloses information about their behavior? 
3. State Data Privacy Statutes 
Frustrated by the failure of the federal government to provide 
comprehensive standards for data privacy protection, states have 
taken matters into their own hands, as the following representative 
examples indicate. 
a. Broad Privacy Protections 
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Not surprisingly, California has been at the forefront of state 
efforts to protect consumer privacy. Established in 2000, the 
California Office of Privacy Protection was created to protect the 
privacy rights of consumers.261 When budget cuts closed this office 
in 2011, a newly created Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit 
with the Attorney General’s office continued the defunct agency’s 
privacy protection efforts.262 This unit enforces both federal and 
state privacy laws. 
In 2004, California enacted the California Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 2003,263 making California the first state to 
require a commercial website to post a privacy policy that: (1) 
identifies for site users the categories of personally identifiable 
information (“PII”) the site collects; (2) indicates the categories of 
third parties with whom the information is shared; (3) describes the 
process, if any, users can follow to view and edit the PII collected; 
and (4) specifies the process by which users will be notified of any 
material changes to the policy.264 This law was updated in 2014 
with two additional disclosure requirements. The first requires a 
website operator that collects PII about an individual to notify 
users how the website operator responds to “do not track” 
requests.265 Second, the website must also disclose whether third 
parties are permitted to collect PII during the user’s site visit.266 
In 2015, Delaware followed suit and enacted an online privacy 
and protection almost identical to that of California.267 In July 
2016, regulations became effective in Delaware that offer to 
website operators optional safe harbor language that could be used 
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to ensure compliance with the Delaware online privacy laws.268 In 
addition, those regulations indicate that if a website operator has a 
privacy policy that complies with the requirements of the 
California Online Privacy Protection Act, the safe harbor will be 
satisfied.269 The Delaware privacy statute’s definition of 
“personally identifiable information” includes most commonly 
items such as name, address, social security number, and email 
address that independently or in combination with other identifiers 
could be personally identifiable.270 But in its safe harbor 
regulations, greater clarity is offered in the description of the 
notification requirements for the kinds of information that the 
website might collect from a user, which include: 
Information about your device or computer, including your IP address, 
geolocation, browser type, browser version, device type, operating 
system, referring [site/service/application]. 
Information about your visits to and use of the site/service/application, 
including how you use the site/service/application, such as describe the 
type of information—examples might include the timing, length, 
frequency, and pattern of use, and the pages, screens, or other displays 
of information looked at by the user.271 
If our patient Pamela is to find any relief within the law, it 
appears that her relief is most likely to be found in a state privacy 
statute, such as that of Delaware, that contains specific language 
that addresses how to handle information collected online about a 
user. 
b. Deceptive Trade Practice 
All states have enacted some form of consumer protection law 
prohibiting deceptive trade practices, but there is variation in terms 
of extent of protections, enforcement mechanisms, and penalties 
for violations.272 In some states, violations of a stated company 
privacy policy are within deceptive trade practice prohibitions. 
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Nebraska, for example, does not impose specific obligations on 
website in terms of what privacy protections must be provided to 
consumers, but under state law a website owner may be guilty of a 
deceptive trade practice if that operator “knowingly makes a false 
or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the 
Internet or otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of 
personal information submitted by members of the public.”273 
Pennsylvania law contains a similar provision.274 As per statute, a 
person commits a deceptive or fraudulent business practice if in the 
course of business such person, “knowingly makes a false or 
misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the Internet 
or otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of personal 
information submitted by members of the public.”275 
c. ISPs and Confidentiality 
In Nevada, Internet service providers are required to keep 
confidential “[a]ll information concerning a subscriber other than 
the electronic mail address of the subscriber, unless the subscriber 
gives permission, in writing or by electronic mail, to the provider 
of the Internet service to disclose the information.”276 Similarly, in 
Minnesota, subject to certain exceptions, ISPs may not “knowingly 
disclose personally identifiable information concerning a consumer 
of the Internet service provider.”277 If the disclosure is incidental to 
the ordinary course of business of the ISP, disclosure may be 
permissible278 as is a disclosure made with the consent of the 
user.279 Minnesota law defines personally identifiable information 
to include information that identifies “[i]nternet or online sites 
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visited by a consumer, or any of the contents of a consumer’s data-
storage devices.”280 
Utah law does not restrict the transfer of an individual’s 
personal information but instead requires a commercial entity that 
either intends to or wants the ability to disclose that nonpublic 
information to a third party for compensation, to notify the 
consumer either orally in writing that the entity “[m]ay choose to 
disclose nonpublic personal information about you, the consumer, 
to a third party for compensation.”281 Such notice should be 
sufficiently noticeable so that the consumer would see it before 
providing any nonpublic information to the entity.282 
IV. THE TRACKING OF HEALTH-RELATED SEARCHES IS NOT 
WITHIN THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED BY HIPAA 
Having concluded that existing federal and state authority 
provides limited to no protection for our user’s search of 
information related to high cholesterol, Part IV considers whether 
protection can be found instead in the privacy rules contained in 
HIPAA. While the health records maintained by hospitals, doctors’ 
offices, and insurance companies are clearly within HIPAA’s 
mandates,283 what is less certain is the status of health-related 
queries potentially traceable back to and incorporated in the online 
profile of an identifiable individual. To reach a conclusion on this 
question, we begin with a look at HIPAA’s genesis, the Act’s 
stated requirements, and interpretations of those requirements. 
A. The Origins of HIPAA Highlight the Importance of Health 
Information Privacy 
Starting in or around 1929, Baylor University permitted local 
schoolteachers to pay insurance premiums to cover any medical 
expenses incurred at its university hospital in Dallas, Texas, 
thereby giving birth to the modern private health insurance 
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industry.284 While other hospitals were quick to adopt similar 
insurance mechanisms, it was not until the late 1940s that 
commercial insurance companies entered the health insurance 
market. The commercial insurance companies’ delayed entry into 
the health insurance market stems from two interrelated reasons: 1) 
whether medical care was an insurable risk since no clear model 
could accurately predict losses and 2) how to profitably price 
premiums when losses are not accurately predictable.285 
In this early insurance market environment, health insurers 
were asymmetrically informed about insurance buyers’ health 
status. Buyers’ private health information provided different 
motivations to seek health insurance and impact the functioning of 
a competitive insurance market. For simplicity, suppose two pools 
of individuals exist in the health-insurance market: (1) high-risk 
individuals who have an unhealthy predisposition—either from 
genetics or lifestyle; and (2) low-risk individuals with no unhealthy 
predisposition. At one extreme, the market exhibits adverse 
selection: knowing more about their health status, low-risk 
individuals will likely choose not to seek health insurance (self-
insure) leaving the health-insurance market comprised primarily of 
high-risk individuals.286 Lacking individuals’ private health 
information, health insurers set high premiums and historically 
excluded individuals from obtaining health-insurance coverage 
resulting in a market failure in the insurance market.287 
Ideally, commercial health insurers seek to separate the pools 
of insurance buyers according to health risk in order to charge 
high-risk individuals high premiums and low-risk individual low 
premiums. However, at least two factors confound insurers’ ability 
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to separate insurance buyers: (1) health uncertainty and (2) 
consumers’ private health information. Lacking private health 
information on the market composition insurees, health insurers 
likely misprice premiums resulting in sub-optimal profit and 
potential market failure. While some empirical evidence suggests 
that adverse selection in insurance markets in general is grossly 
exaggerated, this possibility cannot be safely ignored.288 
To mitigate negative health adverse selection risk, insurers 
attempt to acquire information to screen individuals or groups and 
set premiums according to the expected medical benefits payout.289 
Screening through the practice of community rating methods 
attempt to set insurance premiums according to insurance plan 
member risk characteristics.290 Premiums can vary by individuals 
under community-based rating methods due to geographic 
location, cost-of-living, contract type, and plan design. In contrast, 
experience rating methods screen individuals, or groups of 
individuals, according to personally identifiable risk categories 
thereby more closely matching insurance premiums to risk and 
expected medical benefit payouts to insurees.291 Like community-
based rating, premiums based on experience rating methods can be 
based on geographical location, contract type, and plan design. An 
individual’s historical health data can also help insurers better 
understand the relationship between risk categories and expected 
health care costs to insure an individual or groups of individuals.292 
Health screening and experience rating help insurers mitigate 
the adverse selection problem in the health insurance market. 
Therefore, health insurers have incentives to invest in acquiring as 
much private health information on insurees as possible to guide 
setting premiums and determining coverage eligibility. Insurers’ 
incentives to mitigate the adverse selection problem leaves high-
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risk insurees in vulnerable situations, potentially with no option to 
acquire health insurance coverage. In 1996, President Bill Clinton 
signed the HIPAA legislation into law with the goals of ensuring 
the availability of health coverage and protecting patient privacy.293 
B. The Privacy Rule of HIPAA 
HIPAA was enacted in part to ensure that health insurance 
would be portable—meaning that individuals would be able to 
maintain their health insurance between jobs—and that patient 
health information294 would be secure and private,295 especially in 
the context of the computerization of patients’ medical records. 
The primary concern for the purposes of this article are the 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information (“Privacy Rule”)296 as enacted by the Department of 
Health and Human Services in accordance with HIPAA’s privacy 
mandate. This Privacy Rule represents the first set of national 
regulations that protect certain health information.297 The preamble 
to these standards illustrates the need for the Privacy Rule: 
According to the American Health Information Management 
Association (AHIMA), an average of 150 people, “from nursing staff to 
X-ray technicians, to billing clerks” have access to a patient’s medical 
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records during the course of a typical hospitalization. While many of 
these individuals have a legitimate need to see all or a part of a 
patient’s records, no laws govern who those people are, what 
information they are able to see, and what they are and are not allowed 
to do with that information once they have access to it.298 
The Privacy Rule applies to health plans and health care 
providers and “any health care provider that transmits health 
information in electronic form.”299 It was designed to ensure that 
entities covered by this rule could only provide non-covered 
entities access to an individual’s protected health information 
(“PHI”)300 if the individual authorized that disclosure.301 However, 
the new rule also built in exceptions that would allow health care 
professionals to carry out their business functions; for example, 
PHI could be exchanged with non-covered business associates in 
connection with treatment, payment, and health care 
authorization.302 HIPAA initially defined a business associate as 
one “who performs functions or activities on behalf of, or provides 
certain services to, a covered entity that involve access by the 
business associate to protected health information.”303 When a 
covered entity contracts with other businesses to perform some of 
their functions, the law mandates that the contractual relationship 
ensures that the business associate maintains the privacy of the 
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PHI.304 In 2009, Congress passed the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”) to 
expand the scope and reach of HIPAA.305 HITECH broadened the 
definition of a business associate to “include any subcontractor, ad 
infinitum, ‘that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected 
health information on behalf of the business associate.’ This 
amendment vastly increased the number of entities subject to 
HIPAA.”306 
Taken together, HIPAA and HITECH require that when 
unsecured health information is breached, the covered entity or the 
business associate must notify the individuals affected and the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services of the breach.307 Aware 
that many web-based businesses that collect individual health 
information may not be covered by the terms of HIPAA, in 2010 
the FTC passed the Health Breach Notification Rule to mandate 
that certain entities not covered by HIPAA notify customers (and 
sometimes the media) of any breach of their “unsecured, 
individually identifiable electronic health information.”308 The 
scope of the rule is broad, applying to businesses that are (1) 
vendors309 of personal health records (“PHR”),310 (2) a PHR-related 
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entity, or (3) a third-party service provider for the entities in 
categories 1 and 2.311 
Seeking to offer clarity in terms of the types of entities that will 
be considered a PHR-related entity, the FTC offered the following 
example: 
For example, if you have an app that helps consumers manage their 
medications or lets them upload readings from a device like a blood 
pressure cuff or a pedometer into a personal health record, your 
business is a PHR-related entity. However, if consumers can simply 
input their own information on your site in a way that doesn’t interact 
with personal health records offered by a vendor - for example if your 
site allows consumers to input their weight each week to track their 
fitness goals-you’re not a PHR-related entity.312 
A violation of the health breach notification rule is treated “as 
an unfair or deceptive act or practice,” and violators may be 
penalized up to $40,000 per violation.313 
C. Health-Related Searches as PHI? 
A review of the statutory language of HIPAA in combination 
with the privacy protections implemented by Privacy Rule of the 
DHS leads to the conclusion that in and of itself Pamela’s search of 
“women and high cholesterol,” “cholesterol-lowering drugs,” and 
“coronary artery disease” cannot bring a search engine within the 
“covered entity” and “business associate” classifications of 
HIPAA.314 The question of whether health-related searches might 
fall within PHI becomes more nuanced when that search is 
potentially being combined with other information gleaned from 
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the user’s online activities which when aggregated yield a profile 
that can be traced back to a specific individual.315 
While still not within the letter of the law, there is a question 
whether the capture and aggregation of health-related searches or 
other health-related information gathered online violate the spirit 
of HIPAA. HIPAA was designed, in part, to ensure that patient 
health information remained confidential. HIPAA acknowledges 
the importance of patient control over whom this information is 
shared with. When Pamela searched for women and high 
cholesterol, she was searching for her diagnosed medical 
condition, and to the extent that her search became part of an 
online profile used by website owners for any one of the purposes 
discussed in Part II, this use and exchange of information without 
her consent, and possibly to her economic detriment, would violate 
the spirit of HIPAA’s privacy protection. The issue becomes 
murkier if Pamela searches the internet inputting information that 
is not hers, but someone else’s. For example, suppose she searched 
“treatment for tumors of the pituitary gland,” not because she has 
that condition, but because her best friend was just diagnosed and 
she wants to research in order to better support her friend. If a 
pituitary gland tumor becomes part of the user’s online profile, this 
would appear to be outside the spirit of HIPAA as this information 
is not personal health information regarding the computer user. 
The conclusion that a search engine, such as Google, or a 
website owner, such as WebMD, is not currently impeded in its 
tracking, aggregation, and use of a user’s online activity highlights 
the critical need for privacy law reform that will, at a minimum, 
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offer protection for an unsuspecting computer user’s health-related 
actions. 
V. LEGISLATION LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THIRD-PARTY 
TRACKING IS NEEDED 
Any legislative or regulatory initiative must recognize, as a 
starting point, the legitimate interests of businesses to use certain 
customer information as part of confidential information and trade 
secret-protected assets. Fundamentally, as described in Part II, 
information, including customer information, is valuable and 
integral to the workings and decision-making of businesses. 
Business interests must be balanced against the individual 
customer’s reasonable expectations of privacy in connection with 
health-related data online. We propose the following as a sensible 
scheme designed to protect both these interests. 
As explained in Part III, attempts at comprehensive online 
privacy legislation have repeatedly stalled in Congress. Efforts at 
industry self-regulation have not fared much better. The now-
repealed regulations that the FCC released in October 2016 likely 
resulted from Congressional inaction in this area coupled with an 
awareness that some action must be taken at the federal level as 
technological advances present a greater threat to online privacy. 
Recognizing that comprehensive online privacy legislation is 
not likely to be passed in the short term, we propose instead 
targeted legislation to address the most egregious of the various 
uses of individual information described in this paper. Specifically, 
we advocate controlling the practice of indiscriminate collection, 
transfer, storage, and aggregation of individual health-related 
information obtained through internet searching, through visiting 
health-related content on websites that rely on third-party ad 
exchanges to generate revenue using third-party tracking, and 
through other tracking technologies that can identify an individual 
or household with high probability. Legislation should prohibit 
such uses unless informed users consent in advance.316 
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This proposal achieves the twin objectives of maintaining 
business stability and respecting the privacy of an individual’s 
health data. There would be minimal disruption to business. 
Companies like Google, for example, would not need to change 
their business model.317 They could continue to use first-party 
information based on voluntary provisions of information; 
transactional data; and first-party tracking that does relate 
aggregated health-related data to an individual or household with 
high probability. They also could continue to connect their website 
users to advertising for all non-health purposes. First-party health-
related advertisement could be provided as long as (1) aggregated 
health data is not related to an individual or household or (2) 
information could not be transferred to third parties without 
adequate disclosure and user opt-in. 
This type of targeted legislation would be a step in the right 
direction. It would allow the law to keep pace with technology, 
which is now able to use individual items of data in ways that 
computer users have likely never envisioned. As Congress 
embarks on this path, it follows the lead of the European Union 
Commission which seeks to ensure that “European legislation is 
keeping up with the fast space [sic] at which IT-based services are 
developing and evolving.”318 Indeed, Europe has been recognized 
as a world leader in efforts to protect individual data.319 For 
example, on January 10, 2017 the European Commission released 
                                                                                                         
consent would mean that at a minimum, users should be told that “participation 
is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which the [user] is otherwise entitled, and the [user] may discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the [user] is 
otherwise entitled.” See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (8) (2016). 
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or health. See GOOGLE, Privacy Policy, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
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a Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications, which, among other things, requires that web 
browsers obtain opt-in consent from end users in order to engage 
in third party tracking.320 As per an already existing European 
Directive,321 this consent should take the form of “a clear, 
affirmative action from the end-user of terminal equipment to 
signify his or her freely given, specific informed, and unambiguous 
agreement to the storage and access of such cookies in and from 
the terminal equipment.”322 
CONCLUSION 
The above-recommended privacy protections support the 
reasonable expectations of privacy held by many consumers and 
internet users with minimal negative impact on businesses. This 
alone is sufficient to justify such targeted legislation. In the larger 
context, the US government has articulated how the benefits of 
privacy protection extend beyond the individual:  
Strong privacy protections also are critical to sustaining the trust that 
nurtures Internet commerce and fuels innovation. Trust means the 
companies and technical systems on which we depend meet our 
expectations for privacy, security, and reliability. In addition, United 
States leadership in consumer data privacy can help establish more 
flexible, innovation-enhancing privacy models among our international 
partners.323  
This targeted legislation will protect privacy while strengthening 
and further developing e-commerce in the twenty-first century. 
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